YPGとアレッポ・ファトフ軍作戦司令室がアレッポ市シャイフ・マクスード地区、アフリーン市一帯での戦闘停止で合意(2015年12月20日)

アレッポ県では、シリア人権監視団によると、西クルディスタン移行期民政局人民防衛隊とアレッポ・ファトフ軍作戦司令室が、アレッポ市シャイフ・マクスード地区およびアフリーン市一帯(米トルコが設置合意した「安全保証地帯」西端)での停戦に合意した。

停戦合意は、①人民防衛隊主体のシリア民主軍に所属する革命家軍をマーリア作戦司令室に指揮下に置く、②マーリア作戦司令室は革命家軍メンバーをその拠点にとどめ、シリア軍やダーイシュ(イスラーム国)との戦闘にあたらせる、③アフリーン市郊外のアナーブ村、マリーミーン村、シャワーリガト・ジャウズ村からすべての武装集団を撤退させ、「自由警察」のみが駐留する、といった点を骨子とするという。

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しかし、シリア自由人旅団は声明(声明は19日付)を出し、アレッポ・ファトフ軍作戦司令室と人民防衛隊の停戦合意を受け入れないと発表した。

AFP, December 20, 2015、AP, December 20, 2015、ARA News, December 20, 2015、Champress, December 20, 2015、al-Hayat, December 21, 2015、Iraqi News, December 20, 2015、Kull-na Shuraka’, December 20, 2015、al-Mada Press, December 20, 2015、Naharnet, December 20, 2015、NNA, December 20, 2015、Reuters, December 20, 2015、SANA, December 20, 2015、UPI, December 20, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

アラブ連盟のアラビー事務総長は国連安保理決議2245号を支持(2015年12月20日)

アラブ連盟のナビール・アラビー事務総長は、ウィーンでのISSGの二つの合意(10月30日、11月14日)に従ってシリア紛争の停戦プロセスおよび政治移行プロセスの行程を定めた国連安保理決議第2254号に関して、「シリア危機への真摯に対応する機会を初めて与えた」と高く評価した。

AFP(12月20日付)が伝えた。

AFP, December 20, 2015、AP, December 20, 2015、ARA News, December 20, 2015、Champress, December 20, 2015、al-Hayat, December 21, 2015、Iraqi News, December 20, 2015、Kull-na Shuraka’, December 20, 2015、al-Mada Press, December 20, 2015、Naharnet, December 20, 2015、NNA, December 20, 2015、Reuters, December 20, 2015、SANA, December 20, 2015、UPI, December 20, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

ヒズブッラーの幹部サミール・クンタール氏がイスラエル軍によると思われる攻撃によりダマスカス郊外県ジャルマーナー市で死亡(2015年12月20日)

SANA(12月20日付)は、ヒズブッラーのメンバーで、約30年間(1979年に捕捉)のイスラエルでの投獄生活の末に2008年の捕虜交換で解放されたサミール・クンタール氏が19日晩、ダマスカス郊外県ジャルマーナー市南部にある住宅街に対する「テロ砲撃」で死亡した、と伝えた。

ARA News, December 20, 2015
ARA News, December 20, 2015
SANA, December 20, 2015
SANA, December 20, 2015

この砲撃では、クンタール氏のほかにも複数人が死亡したという。

これに関して、人民議会は声明を出し、クンタール氏殺害について「シリアと地域が曝されているテロは、イスラエル占領政体を筆頭とする欧米および中東地域諸国が指導するシオニスト・タクフィール主義という一つのテロだ」と非難し、イスラエルの関与を断じた。

一方、ヒズブッラーはマナール・チャンネルを通じて声明を出し、クンタール氏がイスラエル軍の空爆で殺害されたと断じた。

声明において、ヒズブッラーは「19日午後10時15分、シオニストの敵機がダマスカス郊外県のジャルマーナー氏の住居ビルを空爆し、イスラエルの刑務所での投獄後に釈放されたレバノン人捕虜の中心人物であるレジスタント、ジハード戦死のサミール・クンタール氏と多くのシリア人住民が殉教した」と発表した。

また、ウムラーン・ズウビー情報大臣、バアス党シリア地域指導部、そしてレバノンのエミール・ラッフード元大統領、シリア民族社会党アスアド・ハルダーン党首、レバノン民主党タラール・アルスラーン党首、アマル運動政治局、シーア派イスラーム評議会アブドゥルアミール・カバラーン副議長、ドゥルーズ派のナスルッディーン・ガリーブ師(シャイフ・ムワッハディーン)、PFLP-GC、ファトフ・インティファーダ派、バアス党イエメン地域指導部、イラン外務省が、イスラエルの越境空爆を非難するとともに、クンタール氏の死に哀悼の意を表明した。

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『ハヤート』(12月21日付)によると、ダマスカス郊外県への空爆に関して公式声明を発表していないが、対レバノン国境地帯での厳戒態勢を強化したという。

また、クンタール氏の死亡が報じられた数時間後、レバノン南部(カリーラ村)からカチューシャ・ロケット弾3発がイスラエルに向けて撃ち込まれたが、イスラエルのメディアによると死傷者、物的被害はなかったという。

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なお、9月30日にロシア軍がシリア領内での空爆を開始した直後の10月15日、ラタキア県フマイミーム航空基地に本営を構えるシリア駐留ロシア空軍とイスラエル軍は、ホットラインを開設し、シリア領空での飛行に関する情報交換をしており、以降、イスラエル軍は、10月30日、11月12日、11月24日、12月4日にシリア領空のヒズブッラー拠点やシリア軍拠点を攻撃するなど、越境空爆を頻発化させている。

また、クンタール氏が攻撃を受けた同市内の建物に滞在していた情報をイスラエル軍(ないしは反体制武装集団)がどのように入手したかは不明。

ジャルマーナー市はダマスカス県とダマスカス国際空港の間に位置する都市で、シリア政府支持者が多く暮らしている。

jaramana

AFP, December 20, 2015、AP, December 20, 2015、ARA News, December 20, 2015、Champress, December 20, 2015、al-Hayat, December 21, 2015、Iraqi News, December 20, 2015、Kull-na Shuraka’, December 20, 2015、al-Mada Press, December 20, 2015、Naharnet, December 20, 2015、NNA, December 20, 2015、Qanat al-Manar, December 20、Reuters, December 20, 2015、SANA, December 20, 2015、UPI, December 20, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

米主導の有志連合はシリア領内で3回の爆撃を実施(2015年12月19日)

米中央軍(CENTCOM)は、12月18日にシリア、イラク領内のダーイシュ(イスラーム国)拠点などに対して20回の空爆を行ったと発表した。

このうちシリア領内での空爆は3回で、アイン・イーサー市近郊(2回)、マンビジュ市近郊(1回)のダーイシュに対して攻撃が行われた。

CENTCOM, December 19, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

シリア軍がヒムス県中部、アレッポ県東部などでダーイシュ(イスラーム国)との交戦を続ける(2015年12月19日)

ヒムス県では、シリア人権監視団によると、シリア軍が県中部のマヒーン町、サダド市でダーイシュ(イスラーム国)と交戦した。

一方、SANA(12月19日付)によると、シリア軍がハドス村、フワーリーン村、カルヤタイン市、タール山、タドムル市西部入り口付近、アルーン農場一帯で、ダーイシュ(イスラーム国)と交戦し、複数の戦闘員を殺傷、拠点・装備を破壊した。

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アレッポ県では、シリア人権監視団によると、シリア軍がダーイシュ(イスラーム国)の支配下にあるダイル・ハーフィル市一帯を砲撃した。

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ラッカ県では、シリア人権監視団によると、戦闘機(所属不明)がラッカ市各所を空爆した。

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ハサカ県では、シリア人権監視団によると、有志連合の航空機がダーイシュ(イスラーム国)の拠点都市の一つシャッダーディー市一帯にビラを散布し、同地一帯への攻撃を予告した。

AFP, December 19, 2015、AP, December 19, 2015、ARA News, December 19, 2015、Champress, December 19, 2015、al-Hayat, December 20, 2015、Iraqi News, December 19, 2015、Kull-na Shuraka’, December 19, 2015、al-Mada Press, December 19, 2015、Naharnet, December 19, 2015、NNA, December 19, 2015、Reuters, December 19, 2015、SANA, December 19, 2015、UPI, December 19, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

アル=カーイダ系組織のヌスラ戦線、トルコマン・イスラーム党などがラタキア県北部の要衝ヌーバ山をシリア軍から奪還(2015年12月19日)

ラタキア県では、シリア人権監視団によると、シャームの民のヌスラ戦線、トルキスターン・イスラーム党などからなるジハード主義武装集団が、シリア軍、国防隊、ヒズブッラー戦闘員、外国人戦闘員らとの戦闘の末、県北部の要衝ヌーバ山を奪還した。

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アレッポ県では、シリア人権監視団によると、シリア軍、国防隊、ヒズブッラー戦闘員、外国人戦闘員が、アル=カーイダ系組織のシャームの民のヌスラ戦線などからなるジハード主義武装集団の拠点であるハーン・トゥーマーン村一帯およびズィルバ村一帯で、ヌスラ戦線、トルキスターン・イスラーム党などと交戦した。

一方、SANA(12月19日付)によると、ヌッブル市とザフラー町の人民諸委員会が、ザフラー町東部に進入しようとしたシャームの民のヌスラ戦線などからなるジハード主義武装集団と交戦し、これを撃退した。

他方、クッルナー・シュラカー(12月19日付)によると、ロシア軍がフライターン市を夜間空爆し、住民6人が死亡した。

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イドリブ県では、シリア人権監視団によると、ロシア軍と思われる戦闘機がタマーニア町、カンスフラ村、マアッラト・ヌウマーン市を空爆した。

一方、SANA(12月19日付)によると、シリア軍がカンスフラ村、ジスル・シュグール市一帯、ハーン・シャイフーン市郊外で、シャームの民のヌスラ戦線などからなるファトフ軍の拠点を攻撃し、戦闘員少なくとも7人を殲滅した。

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ハマー県では、SANA(12月19日付)によると、シリア軍がアトシャーン村でファトフ軍の拠点を攻撃し、戦闘員9人を殺害した。

シリア軍はまたラトミーン村一帯でイッザ旅団大隊連合の司令官2人を殺害、さらにスカイク村ではシャーム自由人イスラーム運動の拠点を破壊した。

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ダマスカス郊外県では、シリア人権監視団によると、ダマスカス・ベイルート街道上にあるシリア軍第4機甲師団の検問所近くで爆弾を仕掛けられた車が爆発し、シリア軍兵士複数が死傷した。

またマルジュ・スルターン村一帯では、シリア軍とジハード主義武装集団が交戦した。

一方、SANA(12月19日付)によると、シリア軍がマイダアー町・ドゥマイル市間の街道で、反体制武装集団と交戦し、複数の戦闘員を殺傷、拠点・装備を破壊した。

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ダルアー県では、SANA(12月19日付)によると、シリア軍がアトマーン村一帯、ヌアイマ村、西ガーリヤ村北西部、ダルアー市各所で反体制武装集団の拠点を攻撃し、複数の戦闘員を殺傷、拠点・装備を破壊した。

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スワイダー県では、SANA(12月19日付)によると、シリア軍がダイル・ダーマー村で、反体制武装集団の拠点を攻撃し、複数の戦闘員を殺傷、拠点・装備を破壊した。

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ヒムス県では、SANA(12月19日付)によると、シリア軍がジャッブーリーン村、アブー・サナースィル村、ウンム・シャルシューフ村でシャームの民のヌスラ戦線などからなるジハード主義武装集団と交戦し、複数の戦闘員を殺傷、拠点・装備を破壊した。

AFP, December 19, 2015、AP, December 19, 2015、ARA News, December 19, 2015、Champress, December 19, 2015、al-Hayat, December 20, 2015、Iraqi News, December 19, 2015、Kull-na Shuraka’, December 19, 2015、al-Mada Press, December 19, 2015、Naharnet, December 19, 2015、NNA, December 19, 2015、Reuters, December 19, 2015、SANA, December 19, 2015、UPI, December 19, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

アル=カーイダ系組織「ヌスラ戦線」のサウジ人指導者が、軍事連合である「ファトフ軍」に代わる新たな政治連合の結成を主唱(2015年12月19日)

アル=カーイダ系組織のシャームの民のヌスラ戦線、シャーム自由人イスラーム運動などからなるファトフ軍の事実上の統括者と目されるサウジアラビア人説教師のアブドゥッラー・ムハイスィニー氏(ジハード布教者センター代表)はツイッターの自身のアカウントを通じて、ファトフ軍という軍事同盟に代わる新たな政治同盟の結成を呼びかけた。

ムハイスィニー氏は「解決策はファトフ軍の交代」と銘打たれた一連の書き込みのなかで、「我々は、強力な軍事同盟が解決策であった段階を通り越した…。今日、ファトフ軍という枠では充分ではなく、シャームの戦場が通過している困難な段階の諸要求に対応しきれなくなっている」としたうえで、「軍事的、合法的、行政的、司法的、政治的な同盟への早急な転換が必要だ」と主唱した。

AFP, December 19, 2015、AP, December 19, 2015、ARA News, December 19, 2015、Champress, December 19, 2015、al-Hayat, December 20, 2015、Iraqi News, December 19, 2015、Kull-na Shuraka’, December 19, 2015、al-Mada Press, December 19, 2015、Naharnet, December 19, 2015、NNA, December 19, 2015、Reuters, December 19, 2015、SANA, December 19, 2015、UPI, December 19, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

国連安保理決議第2254号採択を受けた各国首脳・外相の反応:欧米諸国、トルコはアサド政権の正統性を改めて否定する一方、ロシア、中国、イランは政権退陣はシリア国民が決するべきと主張(2015年12月18日)

バラク・オバマ米大統領は、国連安保理決議第2254号の採択に関して、「シリアでの流血を止め、すべての当事者が前進できるようにするため、アサドが去らねばならないと考えている…。アサドは正統性を完全に失っており…、彼が権力の座にとどまることは…不可能だ…。我々は、この国の大多数が正統だと承認する政府が樹立されない限り、シリアに和平をもたらし、内戦を終わらせることはできないと見ている」と述べた。

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フランスのローラン・ファビウス外務大臣は、国連安保理決議第2254号の採択に関して、「バッシャール・アサドを退任させる保証が必要だ…。彼が(大統領)選挙に再出馬することは、我々には受け入れられない」と述べた。

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英国のフィリップ・ハモンド外務大臣は、国連安保理決議第2254号の採択に関して、聞き解決に向けた「偉大なる前進」としつつ、「シリアの当事者どうしの対話への道が開かれ、シリアから殺人者アサドの体制を遠ざける移行期に至ろうしている」と述べた。

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トルコのアフメト・ダウトオール首相は、国連安保理決議第2254号の採択に関して「アサドが権力の座にとどまることは聞き解決をもたらさない。彼がとどまればさらなる蛮行が行われ、安定が損なわれる…。我々はアサド抜きで真摯にシリアの聞きを解決しようとするすべての国連決議を支持する」と述べた。

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ロシアのヴラジミール・プーチン大統領は、国連安保理決議第2254号の採択に関して「シリア危機に関して、我々は、アサド大統領と米国が容易に協力し合えると考えている。このことについて、最近、オバマ大統領や、サウジアラビアなどのアラブ諸国の友人たちと話した」と述べた。

RT(12月19日付)などロシアの複数のメディアが伝えた。

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イランのホセイン・エミール・アブドゥッラフヤーン外務副大臣(アラブ・アフリカ担当)は、国連安保理決議第2254号に関して、「我々はシリアへの支援を継続する」としたうえで、「政治プロセス終了後にバッシャール・アサドの(大統領選挙への)出馬するかどうかは彼個人にかかわる問題だ。最終的にはそれはシリア人が決めることだ」と述べた。

IRNA(12月19日付)が伝えた。

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中国の王毅外交部長は、国連安保理決議第2254号の採択に関して、「シリア人が国連憲章に従って政治プロセスを主導しなければならない。またシリア国民がシリア人の指導者を選ばねばならない」と述べた。

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シリアのバッシャール・ジャアファリー国連代表大使は、国連安保理決議第2254号の採択に関して「シリアでの政治プロセスが成功するには、シリア政府がそれに主要な当事者として関与することが求められており、我々が成功を望むのなら、このプロセスにかかわるさまざまな側面でシリア政府と連携・協力がなされるべきだ」と述べた。

AFP, December 19, 2015、AP, December 19, 2015、ARA News, December 19, 2015、Champress, December 19, 2015、al-Hayat, December 20, 2015、Iraqi News, December 19, 2015、IRNA, December 19, 2015、Kull-na Shuraka’, December 19, 2015、al-Mada Press, December 19, 2015、Naharnet, December 19, 2015、NNA, December 19, 2015、Reuters, December 19, 2015、RT, December 19, 2015、SANA, December 19, 2015、UPI, December 19, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

国連安保理はジュネーブ合意(2012年6月30日)とウィーン合意(2015年10月30日、11月14日)に基づくシリア紛争解決に向けた停戦・移行プロセスを承認する決議第2254号を全会一致で採択(2015年12月18日)

国連安保理は、シリア紛争における停戦プロセスと政治移行プロセスの行程について定めたウィーン会議でのISSG(国際シリア支援グループ)の二つの合意(10月30日、11月14日)を追認する決議(2254号)を全会一致で採択した。

安保理決議第2254号は、2012年6月30日のジュネーブ合意に基づき、シリア人主導のシリア人による政治移行プロセスを支持し、国連事務総長に対して、ウィーンでのISSGの合意に従い、2016年1月初めを目処にシリア政府と反体制派の交渉を開始させるよう求めている。

また、政治移行プロセスに関しては、交渉開始後6ヶ月を目処に「信頼できる包括的・非宗派的な(移行)政府」を樹立し、新憲法制定の日程と行程を確定し、その後18ヶ月を目処に、新憲法制定の自由で公正な選挙の実施、新憲法制定を実現することへの支持を表明している。

一方、シリア国内での停戦プロセスについては、政治プロセス(移行プロセス)と並行させることを承認し、加盟国、とりわけISSG諸国にその実現に向けた努力を増大させるよう求めている。

また、国連事務総長に対して、決議採択後1ヶ月以内に停戦監視のしくみに関して安保理に報告することを定めている。

そのうえで、ダーイシュ(イスラーム国)、シャームの民のヌスラ戦線、アル=カーイダあるいはダーイシュとつながりのあるその他すべての個人・組織、そして安保理やISSGが指定・合意するそのほかのテロ組織のテロ活動を抑止するようすべての加盟国に求めている。

**

国連安保理決議2245号採択後、ジョン・ケリー米国務長官、ロシアのセルゲイ・ラブロフ外務大臣、スタファン・デミストゥラ・シリア問題担当国連アラブ連盟共同特別代表は共同記者会見を開いた。

会見でケリー国務長官は、アサド大統領の進退に関して「国際社会のみなが必ずしも合意に達していないが、ISSGの大多数は、彼がシリアを統合するだけの力も信頼も失ったと見ている」と述べた。

これに対して、ラブロフ外務大臣は「シリア国民だけが、ジュネーブとウィーンでの諸合意を承認した国連安保理決議に従って自らの未来を決することができる。これは、外国が解決策を押しつけようとしてきたことへの明確な答えだ」と述べた。

また、一部の外国諸国がシリアにおける体制転換を要求していることに関しては、「イラク、リビア、イエメンの教訓から学ばせねばならない…。外国が決定を押しつけるいかなる試みも回避されねばならない…。アサドが去らなければ解決策はないという者は近視眼的であり、まずダーイシュ(イスラーム国)が根絶される必要がある」と強調した。

さらに、シリアの反体制派を「テロ組織」と「合法的な反体制派」に峻別することについては、ダーイシュとシャームの民のヌスラ戦線をテロ組織とみなすことにコンセンサスはあると述べるとともに、「ダマスカスのロシア大使館を標的とした者、シリアの首都を砲撃する者、そして似たようなことを行う者」もテロ組織とみなす必要があると付言した。

**

国連安保理決議第2254号全文は以下の通り:

The Security Council,

Recalling its
resolutions 2042 (2012), 2043 (2012), 2118 (2013), 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014),
2170 (2014), 2175 (2014), 2178 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2199 (2015), 2235 (2015),
and 2249 (2015) and Presidential Statements of 3 August 2011 (
S/PRST/2011/16), 21 March 2012 (S/PRST/2012/6), 5 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/10), 2 October 2013 (S/PRST/2013/15), 24 April 2015 (S/PRST/2015/10) and 17 August 2015 (S/PRST/2015/15),

Reaffirming its strong
commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of
the Syrian Arab Republic, and to the purposes and principles of the Charter of
the United Nations,

Expressing its gravest
concern at the continued suffering of the Syrian people, the dire and
deteriorating humanitarian situation, the ongoing conflict and its persistent
and brutal violence, the negative impact of terrorism and violent extremist
ideology in support of terrorism, the destabilizing effect of the crisis on the
region and beyond, including the resulting increase in terrorists drawn to the
fighting in Syria, the physical destruction in the country, and increasing
sectarianism, and underscoring that the situation will continue to
deteriorate in the absence of a political solution,

Recalling its demand
that all parties take all appropriate steps to protect civilians, including
members of ethnic, religious and confessional communities, and stresses
that, in this regard, the primary responsibility to protect its population lies
with the Syrian authorities,

Reiterating that the
only sustainable solution to the current crisis in Syria is through an
inclusive and Syrian-led political process that meets the legitimate
aspirations of the Syrian people, with a view to full implementation of the
Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012 as endorsed by resolution 2118 (2013),
including through the establishment of an inclusive transitional governing body
with full executive powers, which shall be formed on the basis of mutual
consent while ensuring continuity of governmental institutions,

Encouraging, in this
regard, the diplomatic efforts of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG)
to help bring an end to the conflict in Syria,

Commending the
commitment of the ISSG, as set forth in the Joint Statement on the outcome of
the multilateral talks on Syria in Vienna of 30 October 2015 and the Statement
of the ISSG of 14 November 2015 (hereinafter the “Vienna Statements”), to
ensure a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition based on the Geneva Communiqué
in its entirety, and emphasizing the urgency for all parties in Syria to work
diligently and constructively towards this goal,

Urging all parties to
the UN-facilitated political process to adhere to the principles identified by
the ISSG, including commitments to Syria’s unity, independence, territorial
integrity, and non-sectarian character, to ensuring continuity of governmental
institutions, to protecting the rights of all Syrians, regardless of ethnicity
or religious denomination, and to ensuring humanitarian access throughout the
country,

Encouraging the
meaningful participation of women in the UN-facilitated political process for
Syria,

Bearing in mind the
goal to bring together the broadest possible spectrum of the opposition, chosen
by Syrians, who will decide their negotiation representatives and define their
negotiation positions so as to enable the political process to begin, taking note
of the meetings in Moscow and Cairo and other initiatives to this end, and noting
in particular the usefulness of the meeting in Riyadh on 9-11 December 2015,
whose outcomes contribute to the preparation of negotiations under
UN auspices on a political settlement of the conflict, in accordance with
the Geneva Communique and the “Vienna Statements”, and looking forward
to the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Syria finalizing efforts to this
end,

“1.   Reconfirms
its endorsement of the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012, endorses
the “Vienna Statements” in pursuit of the full implementation of the Geneva Communiqué,
as the basis for a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition in order to
end the conflict in Syria, and stresses that the Syrian people
will decide the future of Syria;

“2.   Requests
the Secretary-General, through his good offices and the efforts of his Special
Envoy for Syria, to convene representatives of the Syrian government and the
opposition to engage in formal negotiations on a political transition process
on an urgent basis, with a target of early January 2016 for the initiation of
talks, pursuant to the Geneva Communiqué, consistent with the 14 November 2015
ISSG Statement, with a view to a lasting political settlement of the crisis;

“3.   Acknowledges
the role of the ISSG as the central platform to facilitate the United Nations’
efforts to achieve a lasting political settlement in Syria;

“4.   Expresses
its
support
, in this regard, for a Syrian-led political process that is
facilitated by the United Nations and, within a target of six months,
establishes credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance and sets a
schedule and process for drafting a new constitution, and further
expresses its support
for free and fair elections, pursuant to the
new constitution, to be held within 18 months and administered under
supervision of the United Nations, to the satisfaction of the governance and to
the highest international standards of transparency and accountability, with
all Syrians, including members of the diaspora, eligible to participate, as set
forth in the 14 November 2015 ISSG Statement;

“5.   Acknowledges
the close linkage between a ceasefire and a parallel political process,
pursuant to the 2012 Geneva Communiqué, and that both initiatives should move
ahead expeditiously, and in this regard expresses its support for a
nationwide ceasefire in Syria, which the ISSG has committed to support and
assist in implementing, to come into effect as soon as the representatives of
the Syrian government and the opposition have begun initial steps towards a
political transition under UN auspices, on the basis of the Geneva Communiqué,
as set forth in the 14 November 2015 ISSG Statement, and to do so on an urgent
basis;

“6.   Requests
the Secretary-General to lead the effort, through the office of his Special
Envoy and in consultation with relevant parties, to determine the modalities
and requirements of a ceasefire as well as continue planning for the support of
ceasefire implementation, and urges Member States, in particular
members of the ISSG, to support and accelerate all efforts to achieve a ceasefire,
including through pressing all relevant parties to agree and adhere to such a
ceasefire;

“7.   Emphasizes
the need for a ceasefire monitoring, verification and reporting mechanism, requests
the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on options for such a
mechanism that it can support, as soon as possible and no later than one month
after the adoption of this resolution, and encourages Member States, including
members of the Security Council, to provide assistance, including through expertise
and in-kind contributions, to support such a mechanism;

“8.   Reiterates
its call in resolution 2249 (2015) for Member States to prevent and suppress
terrorist acts committed specifically by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL, also known as Da’esh), Al-Nusra Front (ANF), and all other individuals,
groups, undertakings, and entities associated with Al Qaeda or ISIL, and other
terrorist groups, as designated by the Security Council, and as may further be
agreed by the ISSG and determined by the Security Council, pursuant to the
Statement of the ISSG of 14 November 2015, and to eradicate the safe haven they
have established over significant parts of Syria, and notes
that the aforementioned ceasefire will not apply to offensive or defensive actions
against these individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, as set forth in
the 14 November 2015 ISSG Statement;

“9.   Welcomes
the effort that was conducted by the government of Jordan to help develop a
common understanding within the ISSG of individuals and groups for possible
determination as terrorists and will consider expeditiously the recommendation
of the ISSG for the purpose of determining terrorist groups;

“10. Emphasizes the need for
all parties in Syria to take confidence building measures to contribute to the
viability of a political process and a lasting ceasefire, and calls on
all states to use their influence with the government of Syria and the Syrian
opposition to advance the peace process, confidence building measures and steps
towards a ceasefire;

“11. Requests the
Secretary-General to report to the Council, as soon as possible and no later
than one month after the adoption of this resolution, on options for further
confidence building measures;

“12. Calls on the parties to
immediately allow humanitarian agencies rapid, safe and unhindered access
throughout Syria by most direct routes, allow immediate, humanitarian
assistance to reach all people in need, in particular in all besieged and
hard-to-reach areas, release any arbitrarily detained persons, particularly
women and children, calls on ISSG states to use their influence immediately
to these ends, and demands the full implementation of resolutions 2139
(2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014) and any other applicable resolutions;

“13. Demands that all
parties immediately cease any attacks against civilians and civilian objects as
such, including attacks against medical facilities and personnel, and any
indiscriminate use of weapons, including through shelling and aerial
bombardment, welcomes the commitment by the ISSG to press the parties
in this regard, and further demands that all parties immediately comply with
their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian
law and international human rights law as applicable;

“14. Underscores the
critical need to build conditions for the safe and voluntary return of refugees
and internally displaced persons to their home areas and the rehabilitation of
affected areas, in accordance with international law, including applicable
provisions of the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
and taking into account the interests of those countries hosting refugees, urges
Member States to provide assistance in this regard, looks forward to the
London Conference on Syria in February 2016, hosted by the United Kingdom,
Germany, Kuwait, Norway and the United Nations, as an important contribution to
this endeavour, and further expresses its support to the post-conflict
reconstruction and rehabilitation of Syria;

“15. Requests that the
Secretary-General report back to the Security Council on the implementation of
this resolution, including on progress of the UN-facilitated political process,
within 60 days;

“16. Decides to remain
actively seized of the matter.”

AFP, December 19, 2015、AP, December 19, 2015、ARA News, December 19, 2015、Champress, December 19, 2015、al-Hayat, December 20, 2015、Iraqi News, December 19, 2015、Kull-na Shuraka’, December 19, 2015、al-Mada Press, December 19, 2015、Naharnet, December 19, 2015、NNA, December 19, 2015、Reuters, December 19, 2015、SANA, December 19, 2015、UPI, December 19, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

シリア軍はトルコ国境の山岳地帯で支配地域を拡大、ロシア軍はイドリブ県を爆撃(2015年12月18日)

ラタキア県では、SANA(12月18日付)によると、シリア軍が人民防衛諸集団とともに、トルコ国境に近い754.5高地、Syriatel塔、アスワド・カビール山、アティーラ村、652地点、687.5地点、526地点、662.8地点、427地点を制圧した。

**

イドリブ県では、クッルナー・シュラカー(12月18日付)によると、ロシア軍がジスル・シュグール市を空爆し、住民7人が死亡、数十人が負傷した。

**

ダマスカス郊外県では、SANA(12月18日付)によると、シリア軍がマルジュ・スルターン村一帯でジハード主義武装集団との戦闘を続け、支配地域を拡大した。

**

ダルアー県では、SANA(12月18日付)によると、シリア軍がハーッラ市、ダルアー市マンシヤ地区南東部、難民キャンプ地区、ダム街道地区、ブスラー・シャーム市バルド村間街道で、シリア革命家戦線大隊、シャームの民のヌスラ戦線などからなるジハード主義武装集団と交戦し、複数の戦闘員を殺傷、拠点・装備を破壊した。

**

ハマー県では、SANA(12月18日付)によると、シリア軍がタマーニア町、アトシャーン村でジュンド・アクサー機構の拠点を攻撃し、複数の戦闘員を殺傷、拠点・装備を破壊した。

**

ヒムス県では、SANA(12月18日付)によると、シリア軍がティールマアッラ村、ナジュマ丘でシャームの民のヌスラ戦線などからなるジハード主義武装集団と交戦し、複数の戦闘員を殺傷、拠点・装備を破壊した。


AFP, December 18, 2015、AP, December 18, 2015、ARA News, December 18, 2015、Champress, December 18, 2015、al-Hayat, December 19, 2015、Iraqi News, December 18, 2015、Kull-na Shuraka’, December 18, 2015、al-Mada Press, December 18, 2015、Naharnet, December 18, 2015、NNA, December 18, 2015、Reuters, December 18, 2015、SANA, December 18, 2015、UPI, December 18, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

ダーイシュ(イスラーム国)がタッル・アブヤド市郊外でYPGの検問所に自爆攻撃(2015年12月18日)

ラッカ県では、ARA News(12月18日付)によると、タッル・アブヤド市郊外のハマーム・トゥルクマーン村にある西クルディスタン移行期民政局人民防衛隊の検問所がダーイシュ(イスラーム国)の自爆攻撃を受けた。

**

スワイダー県では、SANA(12月18日付)によると、シリア軍がブサイナ丘一帯でダーイシュ(イスラーム国)と交戦し、複数の戦闘員を殺傷、拠点・装備を破壊した。

**

ヒムス県では、SANA(12月18日付)によると、シリア軍がワーディー・ザカート、ワーディー・マサク、タドムル市郊外採石場北部、タドムル城南部でダーイシュ(イスラーム国)と交戦し、複数の戦闘員を殺傷、拠点・装備を破壊した。

AFP, December 18, 2015、AP, December 18, 2015、ARA News, December 18, 2015、Champress, December 18, 2015、al-Hayat, December 19, 2015、Iraqi News, December 18, 2015、Kull-na Shuraka’, December 18, 2015、al-Mada Press, December 18, 2015、Naharnet, December 18, 2015、NNA, December 18, 2015、Reuters, December 18, 2015、SANA, December 18, 2015、UPI, December 18, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

米国、ロシア、サウジアラビア、トルコ、イランなど国際シリア協力グループ(ISSG)諸国がニューヨークで外相級会合を開始し、テロ組織の認定などについて協議(2015年12月18日)

国際シリア協力グループ(ISSG)を構成する米国、ロシア、サウジアラビア、トルコ、イランなどがニューヨークで外相級会合を開いた。

『ハヤート』(12月19日付)は、会合では、ヨルダン、トルコが、停戦プロセスと政治移行プロセスから排除すべき「テロ組織」のリストをそれぞれ提出、ヨルダンの167カ国からなるリストには、シリア政府を後援するイラン・イスラーム革命防衛隊クドス軍団とレバノンのヒズブッラーが、トルコのリストには、西クルディスタン移行期民政局を主導するクルド民族主義政党の民主統一党を含まれていたと伝えた。

複数の外交筋によると、これに対して、イランの代表団が、ヨルダンのリストに「怒り」を露わにし、議事が1時間以上中断したという。

これに対して、ヨルダンのナースィル・ジャウダ外務大臣は、ヨルダンが提示したリストが、「ヨルダン一国、ないしはヨルダンの姿勢を反映したものではなく、複数の国の姿勢や提案をまとめたものだ」と述べ、イラン側の怒りに釈明したという。

一方、ロシアが、外相級会合後に予定されている国連安保理でのシリア紛争への対応にかかる決議案の審議を見据えて、ジュネーブ合意(2012年6月)に代えて、ウィーン会議での合意(10月30日、11月14日)を、停戦プロセスと移行プロセスの原則に据えようと試みる一方、「政治的移行」という文言に代えて、「政治的正常化」という文言を国連安保理決議において用いることを要求し、意見の対立が生じたという。

AFP, December 18, 2015、AP, December 18, 2015、ARA News, December 18, 2015、Champress, December 18, 2015、al-Hayat, December 19, 2015、Iraqi News, December 18, 2015、Kull-na Shuraka’, December 18, 2015、al-Mada Press, December 18, 2015、Naharnet, December 18, 2015、NNA, December 18, 2015、Reuters, December 18, 2015、SANA, December 18, 2015、UPI, December 18, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

リヤドのシリア反体制派最高交渉委員会のヒジャーブ委員長は、「アサド政権処罰を譲歩しない」としつつも、対話に向けた信頼醸成の必要を強調(2015年12月18日)

サウジアラビアの首都リヤドでの反体制派合同会合(8~10日)で新設されたシリア政府との交渉にあたる反体制派統一代表団の人選を行うための最高交渉委員会(34人)が、リヤドでの2日にわたる会合を終え、委員長(総合調整役)に選出されたリヤード・ヒジャーブ元首相が記者会見で、「シリア人はバッシャール・アサド政権への処罰について譲歩しない」と強調しつつも、「たとえ我々が、政治的関係正常化をもたらすパートナーがいないと感じているとしても、相手との信頼醸成は重要だと確信している」と述べ、シリア政府との対話に臨む意思を表明した。

『ハヤート』(12月19日付)が伝えた。

AFP, December 18, 2015、AP, December 18, 2015、ARA News, December 18, 2015、Champress, December 18, 2015、al-Hayat, December 19, 2015、Iraqi News, December 18, 2015、Kull-na Shuraka’, December 18, 2015、al-Mada Press, December 18, 2015、Naharnet, December 18, 2015、NNA, December 18, 2015、Reuters, December 18, 2015、SANA, December 18, 2015、UPI, December 18, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

ドイツ諜報機関がシリアの諜報機関(ムハーバラート)との協力関係を再開(2015年12月18日)

ドイツ日刊紙『ディ・ヴェルト』(12月18日付)は、複数の消息筋の話として、ドイツの諜報機関BND(連邦情報局)が、イスラーム過激派に関する情報を交換するため、シリアの諜報機関(ムハーバラート)との協力関係を再開したと伝えた。

同消息筋によると、BNDの高官が近く、シリアの首都ダマスカスを訪問する予定だという。

AFP, December 18, 2015、AP, December 18, 2015、ARA News, December 18, 2015、Champress, December 18, 2015、al-Hayat, December 19, 2015、Iraqi News, December 18, 2015、Kull-na Shuraka’, December 18, 2015、al-Mada Press, December 18, 2015、Naharnet, December 18, 2015、NNA, December 18, 2015、Reuters, December 18, 2015、SANA, December 18, 2015、UPI, December 18, 2015、Die Welt, December 18, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

アサド大統領はオランダのテレビ局とのインタビューで、欧米諸国が即時退任要求を取り下げ、政治移行プロセスにおける残留を認めたことに関して、冗談交じりに「私は荷物をまとめて、去らなければならないと思っていた。だが、今はとどまることができる。ただ、彼らが何を言おうと関係ない」と発言(2015年12月17日)

アサド大統領はオランダのダッチNPO2テレビの単独インタビューに応じた。

インタビュー映像は大統領府がYoutube(https://youtu.be/Cpmgh6xzpSw)を通じて公開、また英文全文およびアラビア語全訳はSANA(http://sana.sy/en/?p=64343http://www.sana.sy/?p=313821)が配信した。

インタビューにおけるアサド大統領の主な発言は以下の通り:

SANA, December 17, 2015
SANA, December 17, 2015

**

「大多数の国民は、政治的な立場を異にしてはいるが政府を支持している。彼らは依然としてシリアの統合、そして多様性のある一つの社会としての社会統合を支持している」。

(難民の多くがシリア政府の弾圧で国を去ったことに関して)「シリア政府の監督・支援のもとに暮らしているテロリスト、過激派、あるいは民兵…の家族もある。彼らはなぜシリアを去らなかったのだ?」

「国民を拷問…、攻撃、殺害し、なおかつ世界で最も強い西欧諸国やもっとも裕福な湾岸諸国、さらにはトルコといった国の敵意に曝されているのなか…、国民の支持がなくしてなぜ5年近くも(体制が)持ちこたえられようか? 国民を拷問して、国民の支持をどのように得られるのか? つまり実際に過ちがあったとしても、そうしたことはどこでも起こり得たろう…とくに戦争においては、個人による過ちは起こり得る。混乱のなか…そうしたことは排除し得ない。しかしこの手の誤り(拷問)が起こることは、国民を拷問する政策を行うこととは異なっている」。

(HRWなどによる人権侵害についての報告について)「政治化している…。こうした報告は…カタールがするような話に基づいている。多くの報告がカタール、サウジアラビアの資金援助のもとに発表されているが、こうしたことには何の意味もない。調査をしたいのであれば、シリアに来ればいい」。

「テロリストと戦うということはどういう意味か? ダーイシュ(イスラーム国)がここにいるという理由だけで戦うのか? その影響があなたの地域(西欧)に及ぶことを恐れているからか? もし動機が恐怖にあり…、価値観に基づかないのなら、我々は(西欧の)同盟者ではない…。テロとの戦いとは原理原則に関わる問題であるべきだ…。テロとの戦いは持続的な原理に基づくべきだ。そうすることで我々は同盟者となり得る」。

「有志連合の空爆はおそらくは見せ掛け(ショー)だ…。しかし現実において、何の役にも立っていない…それは違法だ。国際法に反している。我々は主権国家だ。もし真剣にテロとの戦いを行うのであれば、シリア政府に「テロとの戦いで協力しよう」と呼びかけることを何が妨げているのか? 唯一の妨げとは、西欧の対シリア政策が「この国、あの大統領を孤立させる必要があるので、彼と取引できない」という姿勢に基づいていることだ」。

「欧州の政府のなかには、テロに関してある種の協力、すなわち治安面での協力を行おうとして、諜報機関を派遣した国もある…。もちろん、我々はそうした要請を拒否した」。

「誰が(大統領の座に)とどまるべきかどうかを言えるのはシリア国民だけだ。シリア国民が私にとどまって欲しくないのなら、私は今日にでもすぐに退任しなければならない」。

「欧州、トルコ、サウジアラビア、カタールといった国々はさまざまなかたちでテロリストを支援している」。

(「アサドは退陣しなければならない」と主張してきた米国が「すぐでなくともいい」と言うようになり、またフランスも「シリア大統領は解決策の一部だ」と述べ、態度を軟化させていることに関して、冗談まじりに)「そう言ってくれた彼らに感謝したい。私は荷物をまとめて、去らなければならないと思っていた。だが、今はとどまることができる。ただ、彼らが何を言おうと関係ない…。これはシリア人の問題だからだ」。

「彼ら(欧米諸国)がシリアの問題を真剣に解決したいのなら…、彼らはトルコ経由でのテロリストの流れを止め、資金や武器兵站支援を止めねばならない」。

「我々は現実主義的でありプラグマティックでもあるので、武装集団・組織とも交渉してきた。我々は彼らが合法的だとはみなしていないが…、シリアの未来について交渉している。我々は…彼らが日常生活に戻り、武器を捨て、恩赦の対象となるために交渉してきた…。これこそが現場で今行われている真の問題解決だ。それは各地で進行中だ」。

「我々は問題解決を支援したいと考えているすべての人と対話をしている…。しかし欧米のどの国も対話の用意ができていない」。

(2011年に起こったような反体制抗議デモが再び起きたら、どのように対処するか、との問いに対して)「もし同じことが起こり、人々が警官を殺害したら、我々は対処しなければならない。それが政府としての仕事だ」。

(紛争で無実の人が死んでいることに関して責任を感じるか、との問いに対して)「私自身が判断はできない。なぜなら自分自身について客観的に話すことはできないからだ。つまり、大統領が充分対応できているかどうかはシリア国民が言う問題だ」。

「(シリアの混乱に)関与する国がテロリストの流れを止め、兵站支援を止めるために真剣な対応をすれば、紛争が1年以内に終わることを保証できる」。

AFP, December 17, 2015、AP, December 17, 2015、ARA News, December 17, 2015、Champress, December 17, 2015、al-Hayat, December 18, 2015、Iraqi News, December 17, 2015、Kull-na Shuraka’, December 17, 2015、al-Mada Press, December 17, 2015、Naharnet, December 17, 2015、NNA, December 17, 2015、Reuters, December 17, 2015、SANA, December 17, 2015、UPI, December 17, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

米国主導の有志連合はシリア領内で3回の爆撃を実施(2015年12月18日)

米中央軍(CENTCOM)は、12月17日にシリア、イラク領内のダーイシュ(イスラーム国)拠点などに対して22回の空爆を行ったと発表した。

このうちシリア領内での空爆は3回で、アイン・イーサー市近郊(1回)、マンビジュ市近郊(2回)のダーイシュに対して攻撃が行われた。

CENTCOM, December 18, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

国連安保理はダーイシュ(イスラーム国)への資金源遮断をめざす決議(2253号)を全会一致で採択(2015年12月18日)

国連安保理は、ダーイシュ(イスラーム国)への資金源遮断をめざす決議(2253号)を全会一致で採択した。

国連安保理決議第2253号の全文は以下の通り:

**

“The Security Council,

“Recalling its resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1363 (2001), 1373 (2001), 1390 (2002), 1452 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1566 (2004), 1617 (2005), 1624 (2005), 1699 (2006), 1730 (2006), 1735 (2006), 1822 (2008), 1904 (2009), 1988 (2011), 1989 (2011), 2083 (2012), 2133 (2014), 2170 (2014), 2178 (2014), 2195 (2014), 2199 (2015), 2214 (2015), and 2249 (2015),

“Reaffirming that terrorism in all forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever, wherever, and by whomsoever committed, and reiterating its unequivocal condemnation of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities for ongoing and multiple criminal terrorist acts aimed at causing the deaths of innocent civilians and other victims, destruction of property, and greatly undermining stability,

“Recognizing that terrorism poses a threat to international peace and security and that countering this threat requires collective efforts on national, regional and international levels on the basis of respect for international law and the Charter of the United Nations,

“Reaffirming that terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, or civilization,

“Expressing its gravest concern about the presence, violent extremist ideology and actions of ISIL, Al-Qaida and their affiliates in the Middle East and North Africa and beyond,

“Reaffirming its commitment to sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

“Recalling the Presidential Statements of the Security Council on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts of 15 January 2013 (S/PRST/2013/1), of 28 July 2014 (S/PRST/2014/14), of 19 November 2014 (S/PRST/2014/23), of 29 May 2015 (S/PRST/2015/11), and of 28 July 2015 (S/PRST/2015/14),

“Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including applicable international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, stressing in this regard the important role the United Nations plays in leading and coordinating this effort,

“Recognizing that development, security, and human rights are mutually reinforcing and are vital to an effective and comprehensive approach to countering terrorism, and underlining that a particular goal of counter-terrorism strategies should be to ensure sustainable peace and security,

“Reaffirming its resolution 1373 (2001) and in particular its decisions that all States shall prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts and refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists,

“Stressing that terrorism can only be defeated by a sustained and comprehensive approach involving the active participation and collaboration of all States and international and regional organizations to impede, impair, isolate, and incapacitate the terrorist threat,

“Emphasizing that sanctions are an important tool under the Charter of the United Nations in the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security, including in support of countering terrorism, and stressing in this regard the need for robust implementation of the measures in paragraph 2 of this resolution,

“Recalling that ISIL is a splinter group of Al-Qaida, and recalling further that any individual, group, undertaking, or entity supporting ISIL or Al-Qaida is eligible for listing,

“Condemning the frequent, recent terrorist attacks perpetrated by ISIL around the world resulting in numerous casualties, recognizing the need for sanctions to reflect current threats and, in this regard, recalling paragraph 7 of resolution 2249 (2015),

“Reminding all States that they have an obligation to take the measures described in paragraph 2 with respect to all individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities included on the list created pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1989 (2011), 2083 (2012), and 2161 (2014) (now and hereunder referred to as the “ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List”), regardless of the nationality or residence of such individuals, groups, undertakings, or entities,

“Urging all Member States to participate actively in maintaining and updating the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List by contributing additional information pertinent to current listings, submitting delisting requests when appropriate, and by identifying and nominating for listing additional individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities which should be subject to the measures referred to in paragraph 2 of this resolution,

“Reminding the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) (“the Committee”) to remove expeditiously and on a case-by-case basis individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities that no longer meet the criteria for listing outlined in this resolution, welcoming improvements to the Committee’s procedures and the format of the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, expressing its intent to continue efforts to ensure that procedures are fair and clear, and recognizing the challenges, both legal and otherwise, to the measures implemented by Member States under paragraph 2 of this resolution,

“Recognizing the importance of building capacities of Member States to counter terrorism and terrorist financing,

“Welcoming again the establishment of the Office of the Ombudsperson pursuant to resolution 1904 (2009) and the enhancement of the Ombudsperson’s mandate in resolutions 1989 (2011), 2083 (2012), and 2161 (2015), noting the Office of the Ombudsperson’s significant contribution in providing additional fairness and transparency, and recalling the Security Council’s firm commitment to ensuring that the Office of the Ombudsperson is able to continue to carry out its role effectively and independently, in accordance with its mandate,

“Welcoming the Ombudsperson’s biannual reports to the Security Council, including the reports submitted on 21 January 2011, 22 July 2011, 20 January 2012, 30 July 2012, 31 January 2013, 31 July 2013, 31 January 2014, 31 July 2014, and 2 February 2015,

“Welcoming the continuing cooperation between the Committee and INTERPOL, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, in particular on technical assistance and capacity-building, and all other United Nations bodies, and strongly encouraging further engagement with the UN Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) to ensure overall coordination and coherence in the counter-terrorism efforts of the United Nations system,

“Recalling its resolutions 2199 (2015) and 2133 (2014) strongly condemning kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups for any purpose, including with the aim of raising funds or gaining political concessions, expressing its determination to prevent kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups and to secure the safe release of hostages without ransom payments or political concessions in accordance with applicable international law, reiterating its call upon all Member States to prevent terrorists from benefiting directly or indirectly from ransom payments or from political concessions and to secure the safe release of hostages, and welcoming the endorsement by the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) in September 2015 of the “Addendum to the Algiers Memorandum on Good Practices on Preventing and Denying the Benefits of Kidnapping for Ransom by Terrorists”,

“Gravely concerned that in some cases ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities continue to profit from involvement in transnational organized crime, and expressing concern that terrorists benefit from transnational organized crime in some regions, including from the trafficking of arms, persons, drugs, and artefacts, and from the illicit trade in natural resources including gold and other precious metals and stones, minerals, wildlife, charcoal and oil, as well as from kidnapping for ransom and other crimes including extortion and bank robbery,

“Recognizing the need to take measures to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism, terrorist organizations, and individual terrorists even in the absence of a link to a specific terrorist act, including from the proceeds of organized crime, inter alia, the illicit production and trafficking of drugs and their chemical precursors, and recalling paragraph 5 of resolution 1452,

“Recognizing the need for Member States to prevent the abuse of non‑governmental, non-profit and charitable organizations by and for terrorists, and calling upon non-governmental, non-profit, and charitable organizations to prevent and oppose, as appropriate, attempts by terrorists to abuse their status, while recalling the importance of fully respecting the rights to freedom of expression and association of individuals in civil society and freedom of religion or belief, and welcoming the relevant updated Best Practices Paper issued by the Financial Action Task Force for the appropriate, risk-based implementation of the international standard related to preventing terrorist abuse of the non-profit sector,

“Recalling its decision that Member States shall eliminate the supply of weapons, including small arms and light weapons, to terrorists, as well as its calls on States to find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information regarding traffic in arms, and to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional, and international levels,

“Expressing concern at the increased use, in a globalized society, by terrorists and their supporters, of new information and communications technologies, in particular the Internet, to facilitate terrorist acts, and condemning their use to incite, recruit, fund, or plan terrorist acts,

“Expressing concern at the flow of international recruits to ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated groups and the scale of this phenomenon, and recalling its resolution 2178 (2014) deciding that Member States shall, consistent with international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law, prevent and suppress the recruiting, organizing, transporting, or equipping of foreign terrorist fighters and the financing of their travel and of their activities,

“Reiterating the obligation of Member States to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of any individual about whom that State has credible information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that he or she is seeking entry into or transit through their territory for the purpose of participating in the foreign terrorist fighter-related activities described in paragraph 6 of resolution 2178 (2014), and reiterating further the obligation of Member States to prevent the movement of terrorist groups, in accordance with applicable international law, by, inter alia, effective border controls, and, in this context, to exchange information expeditiously, improve cooperation among competent authorities to prevent the movement of terrorists and terrorist groups to and from their territories, the supply of weapons for terrorists, and financing that would support terrorists,

“Condemning any engagement in direct or indirect trade, in particular of oil and oil products, modular refineries, and related materiel including chemicals and lubricants, with ISIL, ANF, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities designated by the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), and reiterating that such engagement would constitute support for such individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities and may lead to further listings by the Committee,

“Condemning the destruction of cultural heritage in Iraq and Syria particularly by ISIL and ANF, including targeted destruction of religious sites and objects; and recalling its decision that all Member States shall take appropriate steps to prevent the trade in Iraqi and Syrian cultural property and other items of archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific, and religious importance illegally removed from Iraq since 6 August 1990 and from Syria since 15 March 2011, including by prohibiting cross-border trade in such items, thereby allowing for their eventual safe return to the Iraqi and Syrian people,

“Recalling its resolution 2178 (2014) expressing concern with the continued threat posed to international peace and security by ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities, and reaffirming its resolve to address all aspects of that threat, including terrorist acts perpetrated by foreign terrorist fighters,

“Condemning in the strongest terms ‎abductions of women and children by ISIL, ANF, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities and recalling resolution 2242 (2015), expressing outrage at their exploitation and abuse, including rape, sexual violence, forced marriage, and enslavement by these entities, encouraging all State and non-state actors with evidence to bring it to the attention of the Council, along with any information that such human trafficking may support the perpetrators financially, emphasizing that this resolution requires States to ensure that their nationals and persons within their territory do not make available any funds, financial assets or economic resources for ISIL’s benefit, and noting that any person or entity who transfers funds to ISIL directly or indirectly in connection with such exploitation and abuse would be eligible for listing by the Committee,

“Welcoming the efforts of the Secretariat to standardize the format of all United Nations sanctions lists to facilitate implementation by national authorities, further welcoming the Secretariat’s efforts to translate all list entries and narrative summaries of reasons for listing available in all official languages of the United Nations, and encouraging the Secretariat, with the assistance of the Monitoring Team, as appropriate, to continue its work to implement the data model approved by the Committee,

“Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Measures

“1. Decides that, from the date of adoption of this resolution, the 1267/1989 Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee shall henceforth be known as the “1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee” and the Al-Qaida Sanctions List shall henceforth be known as the “ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List”;

“2. Decides that all States shall take the following measures as previously imposed by paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1333 (2000), paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1390 (2002), and paragraphs 1 and 4 of resolution 1989 (2011), with respect to ISIL (also known as Da’esh), Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities:

Asset Freeze

(a) Freeze without delay the funds and other financial assets or economic resources of these individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, including funds derived from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction, and ensure that neither these nor any other funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available, directly or indirectly for such persons’ benefit, by their nationals or by persons within their territory;

Travel Ban

(b) Prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of these individuals, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige any State to deny entry or require the departure from its territories of its own nationals and this paragraph shall not apply where entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process or the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis only that entry or transit is justified;

Arms Embargo

(c) Prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to these individuals, groups, undertakings and entities from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical advice, assistance or training related to military activities;

Listing Criteria

“3. Decides that acts or activities indicating that an individual, group, undertaking or entity is associated with ISIL or Al-Qaida and therefore eligible for inclusion in the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List include:

(a) Participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of;

(b) Supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to;

(c) Recruiting for; or otherwise supporting acts or activities of Al-Qaida, ISIL, or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof;

“4. Notes that such means of financing or support include but are not limited to the use of proceeds derived from crime, including the illicit cultivation, production and trafficking of narcotic drugs and their precursors;

“5. Confirms that any individual, group, undertaking or entity either owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by, or otherwise supporting, any individual, group, undertaking or entity associated with Al-Qaida or ISIL, including on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, shall be eligible for listing;

“6. Confirms that the requirements in paragraph 2 (a) above apply to financial and economic resources of every kind, including but not limited to those used for the provision of Internet hosting and related services, used for the support of Al-Qaida, ISIL, and other individuals, groups, undertakings or entities included on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List;

“7. Confirms that the requirements in paragraph 2 (a) above apply to funds, financial assets or economic resources that may be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of listed individuals in connection with their travel, including costs incurred with respect to transportation and lodging, and that such travel-related funds, other financial assets or economic resources may only be provided in accordance with the exemption procedures set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1452 (2002), as amended by resolution 1735 (2006), and in paragraphs 10, 74 and 75 below;

“8. Confirms further that the requirements in paragraph 2 (a) above shall also apply to the payment of ransoms to individuals, groups, undertakings or entities on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, regardless of how or by whom the ransom is paid;

“9. Reaffirms that Member States may permit the addition to accounts frozen pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 2 above of any payment in favour of listed individuals, groups, undertakings or entities, provided that any such payments continue to be subject to the provisions in paragraph 2 above and are frozen;

“10. Encourages Member States to make use of the provisions regarding available exemptions to the measures in paragraph 2 (a) above, set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1452 (2002), as amended by resolution 1735 (2006), confirms that exemptions to the travel ban must be submitted by Member States, individuals or the Ombudsperson, as appropriate, including when listed individuals travel for the purpose of fulfilling religious obligations, and notes that the Focal Point mechanism established in resolution 1730 (2006) may receive exemption requests submitted by, or on behalf of, an individual, group, undertaking or entity on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, or by the legal representative or estate of such individual, group, undertaking or entity, for Committee consideration, as described in paragraph 76 below;

Measures Implementation

“11. Reiterates the importance of all States identifying, and if necessary introducing, adequate procedures to implement fully all aspects of the measures described in paragraph 2 above;

“12. Reaffirms that those responsible for committing, organizing, or supporting terrorist acts must be held accountable, recalls its decision in resolution 1373 (2001) that Member States shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings, underlines the importance of fulfilling this obligation with respect to such investigations or proceedings involving ISIL, Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and urges Member States to provide full coordination in such investigations or proceedings, especially with those States where, or against whose citizens, terrorist acts are committed, in accordance with their obligations under international law, in order to find and bring to justice, extradite, or prosecute any person who supports, facilitates, participates or attempts to participate in the direct or indirect financing of activities conducted by ISIL, Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities;

“13. Reiterates Member States’ obligation to ensure that their nationals and persons in their territory not make available economic resources to ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities, recalls also that this obligation applies to the direct and indirect trade in oil and refined oil products, modular refineries, and related material including chemicals and lubricants, and other natural resources, and recalls further the importance of all Member States complying with their obligation to ensure that their nationals and persons within their territory do not make donations to individuals and entities designated by the Committee or those acting on behalf of or at the direction of designated individuals or entities;

“14. Encourages all Member States to more actively submit to the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) listing requests of individuals and entities supporting ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and directs the Committee to immediately consider, in accordance with its resolution 2199 (2015), designations of individuals and entities engaged in financing, supporting, facilitating acts or activities, including in oil and antiquities trade-related activities with ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities;

“15. Expresses increasing concern about the lack of implementation of resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011), and 2199 (2015), including the insufficient level of reporting by Member States to the Committee on the measures they have taken to comply with its provisions and calls upon Member States to take the necessary measures to fulfil their obligation under paragraph 12 of resolution 2199 to report to the Committee interdictions in their territory of any oil, oil products, modular refineries, and related material being transferred to or from ISIL or ANF, and calls upon Member States to report also such interdictions of antiquities, as well as the outcome of proceedings brought against individuals and entities as a result of any such activity;

“16. Strongly urges all Member States to implement the comprehensive international standards embodied in the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) revised Forty Recommendations on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation, particularly Recommendation 6 on targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism and terrorist financing; to apply the elements in FATF’s Interpretive Note to Recommendation 6, with the final objective of effectively preventing terrorists from raising, moving and using funds, in line with the objectives of Immediate Outcome 10 of the FATF methodology; to take note of, inter alia, related best practices for effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism and terrorist financing and the need to have appropriate legal authorities and procedures to apply and enforce targeted financial sanctions that are not conditional upon the existence of criminal proceedings; and to apply an evidentiary standard of proof of “reasonable grounds” or “reasonable basis”, as well as the ability to collect or solicit as much information as possible from all relevant sources;

“17. Welcomes the recent FATF reports on the Financing of the Terrorist Organization ISIL (published February 2015) and Emerging Terrorist Financing Risks (published October 2015) that includes discussion of the ISIL threat, welcomes further the FATF clarifications to Interpretive Note to Recommendation 5 on the criminalization of terrorist financing to incorporate the relevant element of UNSCR 2178, specifically clarifying that terrorist financing includes the financing of the travel of individuals who travel or attempt to travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, and highlights that FATF Recommendation 5 applies to the financing of terrorist organizations or individual terrorists for any purpose, including but not limited to recruitment, training, or travel, even in the absence of a link to a specific terrorist act;

“18. Encourages FATF to continue its efforts to prioritize countering terrorist financing, in particular identifying and working with Member States with strategic anti-money laundering and countering terrorist financing (AML/CFT) deficiencies that have hindered Member States from effectively countering the financing of terrorism, including by ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, group, entities and undertakings, and in this regard, reiterates that the provision of economic resources to such groups is a clear violation of this and other relevant resolutions and is not acceptable;

“19. Clarifies that the obligation in paragraph 1(d) of resolution 1373 (2001) applies to making funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of terrorist organizations or individual terrorists for any purpose, including but not limited to recruitment, training, or travel, even in the absence of a link to a specific terrorist act;

“20. Calls upon States to ensure that they have established as a serious criminal offence in their domestic laws and regulations the wilful violation of the prohibition described in paragraph 1(d) of resolution 1373 (2001);

“21. Calls upon Member States to move vigorously and decisively to cut the flows of funds and other financial assets and economic resources to individuals and entities on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, as required by paragraph 2 (a), and taking into account relevant FATF Recommendations and international standards designed to prevent the abuse of non-profit organizations, formal as well as informal/alternative remittance systems and the physical trans-border movement of currency, while working to mitigate the impact on legitimate activities through these mediums;

“22. Urges Member States to act cooperatively to prevent terrorists from recruiting, to counter their violent extremist propaganda and incitement to violence on the Internet and social media, including by developing effective counter narratives, while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms and in compliance with obligations under international law, and stresses the importance of cooperation with civil society and the private sector in this endeavor;

“23. Urges Member States to promote awareness of the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List as widely as possible, including to relevant domestic agencies, the private sector and the general public to ensure effective implementation of the measures in paragraph 2 above and encourages Member States to urge that their respective company, property and other relevant public and private registries regularly screen their available databases, including but not limited to those with legal and/or beneficial ownership information, against the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List;

“24. Highlights the importance of strong relationships with the private sector in countering the financing of terrorism and calls upon Member States to engage with financial institutions and share information on terrorist financing (TF) risks to provide greater context for their work in identifying potential TF activity related to ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and to promote stronger relationships between governments and the private sector in countering terrorist financing;

“25. Recognizes the importance of information sharing within and between governments to effectively counter the financing of terrorism, calls upon Member States to continue exercising vigilance over relevant financial transactions and improve information-sharing capabilities and practices within and between governments through multiple authorities and channels, including law enforcement, intelligence, security services, and financial intelligence units, and also calls upon Member States to improve integration and utilization of financial intelligence with other types of information available to national governments to more effectively counter the terrorist financing threats posed by ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities;

“26. Decides that Member States, in order to prevent ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities from obtaining, handling, storing, using or seeking access to all types of explosives, whether military, civilian or improvised explosives, as well as to raw materials and components that can be used to manufacture improvised explosive devices or unconventional weapons, including (but not limited to) chemical components, detonators, detonating cord, or poisons, shall undertake appropriate measures to promote the exercise of enhanced vigilance by their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction that are involved in the production, sale, supply, purchase, transfer and storage of such materials, including through the issuance of good practices, and further encourages Member States to share information, establish partnerships, and develop national strategies and capabilities to counter improvised explosive devices;

“27. Encourages Member States, including through their permanent missions, and relevant international organizations to meet the Committee for in-depth discussion on any relevant issues;

“28. Urges all Member States, in their implementation of the measures set out in paragraph 2 above, to ensure that fraudulent, counterfeit, stolen and lost passports and other travel documents are invalidated and removed from circulation, in accordance with domestic laws and practices, as soon as possible, and to share information on those documents with other Member States through the INTERPOL database;

“29. Encourages Member States to share, in accordance with their domestic laws and practices, with the private sector information in their national databases related to fraudulent, counterfeit, stolen and lost identity or travel documents pertaining to their own jurisdictions, and, if a listed party is found to be using a false identity including to secure credit or fraudulent travel documents, to provide the Committee with information in this regard;

“30. Encourages Member States that issue travel documents to listed individuals to note, as appropriate, that the bearer is subject to the travel ban and corresponding exemption procedures;

“31. Encourages Member States to consult the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List when considering whether to grant travel visa applications, for the purpose of effectively implementing the travel ban;

“32. Encourages Member States to exchange information expeditiously with other Member States, in particular States of origin, destination and transit, when they detect the travel of individuals on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List;

“33. Encourages designating States to inform the Monitoring Team whether a national court or other legal authority has reviewed a listed party’s case and whether any judicial proceedings have begun, and to include any other relevant information when submitting the standard form for listing;

“34. Encourages all Member States to designate national focal points in charge of liaising with the Committee and the Monitoring Team on issues related to the implementation of the measures described in paragraph 2 above and the assessment of the threat from ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities;

“35. Encourages all Member States to report to the Committee on obstacles to the implementation of the measures described in paragraph 2 above, with a view to facilitating technical assistance;

“36. Calls upon all States to submit an updated report to the Committee no later than 120 days from the date of adoption of this resolution on their implementation, including relevant enforcement actions as appropriate, of the measures referred to in paragraph 2 of this resolution;

The Committee

“37. Directs the Committee to continue to ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals, groups, undertakings and entities on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List and for removing them as well as for granting exemptions per resolution 1452 (2002), and directs the Committee to keep its guidelines under active review in support of these objectives;

“38. Directs the Committee, as a matter of priority, to review its guidelines with respect to the provisions of this resolution, in particular paragraphs 23, 26, 30, 31, 34, 47, 52, 57, 59, 64, 77, 78, 80 and 81;

“39. Requests the Committee to report to the Council on its findings regarding Member States’ implementation efforts, and identify and recommend steps necessary to improve implementation;

“40. Directs the Committee to identify possible cases of non-compliance with the measures pursuant to paragraph 2 above and to determine the appropriate course of action on each case, and directs the Chair, in regular reports to the Council pursuant to paragraph 87 below, to provide progress reports on the Committee’s work on this issue;

“41. Confirms that no matter should be left pending before the Committee for a period longer than six months, unless the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that extraordinary circumstances require additional time for consideration, in accordance with the Committee’s guidelines;

“42. Requests the Committee to facilitate, through the Monitoring Team or specialized United Nations agencies, assistance on capacity-building for enhancing implementation of the measures, upon request by Member States;

Listing

“43. Encourages all Member States to submit to the Committee for inclusion on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List names of individuals, groups, undertakings and entities participating, by any means, in the financing or support of acts or activities of ISIL, Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities;

“44. Reiterates that the measures referred to in paragraph 2 of this resolution are preventative in nature and are not reliant upon criminal standards set out under national law;

“45. Reaffirms that, when proposing names to the Committee for inclusion on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, Member States shall use the standard form for listing and provide a statement of case that should include as detailed and specific reasons as possible describing the proposed basis for the listing, and as much relevant information as possible on the proposed name, in particular sufficient identifying information to allow for the accurate and positive identification of individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities, and to the extent possible, the information required by INTERPOL to issue a Special Notice, and reaffirms that the statement of case shall be releasable, upon request, except for the parts a Member State identifies as being confidential to the Committee, and may be used to develop the narrative summary of reasons for listing described in paragraph 49 below;

“46. Reaffirms that Member States proposing a new listing, as well as Member States that have proposed names for inclusion on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List before the adoption of this resolution, shall specify if the Committee or the Ombudsperson may not make known the Member State’s status as a designating State;

“47. Encourages Member States to submit, where available and in accordance with their national legislation, photographs and other biometric data of individuals for inclusion in INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices;

“48. Directs the Committee to continue to update, as necessary, the standard form for listing in accordance with the provisions of this resolution; further directs the Monitoring Team to report to the Committee on further steps that could be taken to improve the quality of the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List and Consolidated Sanctions List, including by improving identifying information, as well as steps to ensure that INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notices exist for all listed individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities; and further directs the Secretariat, with the assistance of the Monitoring Team, to build and maintain the data model approved by the Committee, with a view to its completion by June 2017 and requests the Secretary-General to provide additional resources in this regard;

“49. Directs the Committee, with the assistance of the Monitoring Team and in coordination with the relevant designating States, to make accessible on the Committee’s website, at the same time a name is added to the ISIL (Da’esh) and
Al-Qaida Sanctions List, a narrative summary of reasons for listing that are as detailed and specific as possible, as well as additional relevant information;

“50. Encourages Member States and relevant international organizations and bodies to inform the Committee of any relevant court decisions and proceedings so that the Committee can consider them when it reviews a corresponding listing or updates a narrative summary of reasons for listing;

“51. Calls upon all members of the Committee and the Monitoring Team to share with the Committee any information they may have available regarding a listing request from a Member State so that this information may help inform the Committee’s decision on listing and provide additional material for the narrative summary of reasons for listing described in paragraph 49;

“52. Reaffirms that the Secretariat shall, after publication but within three working days after a name is added to the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, notify the Permanent Mission of the State or States where the individual or entity is believed to be located and, in the case of individuals, the state of which the person is a national (to the extent this information is known), requests the Secretariat to publish on the Committee’s website all relevant publicly releasable information, including the narrative summary of reasons for listing, immediately after a name is added to the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List;

“53. Reaffirms the requirement that Member States take all possible measures, in accordance with their domestic laws and practices, to notify or inform in a timely manner the listed individual or entity of the listing and to include with this notification the narrative summary of reasons for listing, a description of the effects of listing, as provided in the relevant resolutions, the Committee’s procedures for considering delisting requests, including the possibility of submitting such a request to the Ombudsperson in accordance with paragraph 43 of resolution 2083 (2012) and annex II of this resolution, and the provisions of resolution 1452 (2002) regarding available exemptions, including the possibility of submitting such requests through the Focal Point mechanism in accordance with paragraphs 10 and 76 of this resolution;

Review of Delisting Requests — Ombudsperson/Member States

“54. Decides to extend the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsperson, established by resolution 1904 (2009), as reflected in the procedures outlined in annex II of this resolution, for a period of twenty four months from the date of expiration of the Office of the Ombudsperson’s current mandate in December 2017, affirms that the Ombudsperson shall continue to receive requests from individuals, groups, undertakings or entities seeking to be removed from the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List in an independent and impartial manner and shall neither seek nor receive instructions from any government, and affirms that the Ombudsperson shall continue to present to the Committee observations and a recommendation on the delisting of those individuals, groups, undertakings or entities that have requested removal from the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List through the Office of the Ombudsperson, either a recommendation to retain the listing or a recommendation that the Committee consider delisting;

“55. Recalls its decision that the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 2 of this resolution shall remain in place with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity, where the Ombudsperson recommends retaining the listing in the Comprehensive Report of the Ombudsperson on a delisting request pursuant to annex II;

“56. Recalls its decision that the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 2 of this resolution shall terminate with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity 60 days after the Committee completes consideration of a Comprehensive Report of the Ombudsperson, in accordance with annex II of this resolution, including paragraph 7 (h) thereof, where the Ombudsperson recommends that the Committee consider delisting, unless the Committee decides by consensus before the end of that 60-day period that the requirement shall remain in place with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity; provided that, in cases where consensus does not exist, the Chair shall, on the request of a Committee Member, submit the question of whether to delist that individual, group, undertaking or entity to the Security Council for a decision within a period of 60 days; and provided further that, in the event of such a request, the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 2 of this resolution shall remain in force for that period with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity until the question is decided by the Security Council;

“57. Recalls its decision that the Committee may, by consensus, shorten the 60-day period referred to in paragraph 56 on a case-by-case basis;

“58. Reiterates that the measures referred to in paragraph 2 of this resolution are preventative in nature and are not reliant upon criminal standards set out under national law;

“59. Underscores the importance of the Office of the Ombudsperson, and requests the Secretary-General to continue to strengthen the capacity of the Office of the Ombudsperson by providing necessary resources, including for translation services, as appropriate, and to make the necessary arrangements to ensure its continued ability to carry out its mandate in an independent, effective and timely manner, and to provide the Committee an update on actions taken in six months;

“60. Strongly urges Member States to provide all relevant information to the Ombudsperson, including any relevant confidential information, where appropriate, encourages Member States to provide relevant information, including any detailed and specific information, when available and in a timely manner, welcomes those national arrangements entered into by Member States with the Office of the Ombudsperson to facilitate the sharing of confidential information, strongly encourages Member States’ further progress in this regard, including by concluding arrangements with the Office of the Ombudsperson for the sharing of such information, and confirms that the Ombudsperson must comply with any confidentiality restrictions that are placed on such information by Member States providing it;

“61. Strongly urges Member States and relevant international organizations and bodies to encourage individuals and entities that are considering challenging or are already in the process of challenging their listing through national and regional courts to first seek removal from the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List by submitting delisting petitions to the Office of the Ombudsperson;

“62. Notes the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) international standards and, inter alia, best practices relating to targeted financial sanctions, as referenced in paragraph 21 of this resolution;

“63. Recalls its decision that when the designating State submits a delisting request, the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 2 of this resolution shall terminate with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity after 60 days unless the Committee decides by consensus before the end of that 60-day period that the measures shall remain in place with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity; provided that, in cases where consensus does not exist, the Chair shall, on the request of a Committee Member, submit the question of whether to delist that individual, group, undertaking or entity to the Security Council for a decision within a period of 60 days; and provided further that, in the event of such a request, the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 2 of this resolution shall remain in force for that period with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity until the question is decided by the Security Council;

“64. Also recalls its decision that the Committee may, by consensus, shorten the 60-day period referred to in paragraph 63 on a case-by-case basis;

“65. Further recalls its decision that, for purposes of submitting a delisting request in paragraph 63, consensus must exist between or among all designating States in cases where there are multiple designating States; and further recalls its decision that co-sponsors of listing requests shall not be considered designating States for purposes of paragraph 63;

“66. Strongly urges designating States to allow the Ombudsperson to reveal their identities as designating States to those listed individuals and entities that have submitted delisting petitions to the Ombudsperson;

“67. Directs the Committee to continue to work, in accordance with its guidelines, to consider delisting requests of Member States for the removal from the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List of individuals, groups, undertakings and entities that are alleged to no longer meet the criteria established in the relevant resolutions, and set out in paragraph 2 of this resolution, and strongly urges Member States to provide reasons for submitting their delisting requests;

“68. Encourages States to submit delisting requests for individuals that are officially confirmed to be dead, and for entities reported or confirmed to have ceased to exist, while at the same time taking all reasonable measures to ensure that assets that had belonged to these individuals or entities will not be transferred or distributed to other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List or any other Security Council sanctions list;

“69. Encourages Member States, when unfreezing the assets of a deceased individual or an entity that is reported or confirmed to have ceased to exist as a result of a delisting, to recall the obligations set forth in resolution 1373 (2001) and, particularly, to prevent unfrozen assets from being used for terrorist purposes;

“70. Reaffirms that, prior to the unfreezing of any assets that have been frozen as a result of the listing of Usama bin Laden, Member States shall submit to the Committee a request to unfreeze such assets and shall provide assurances to the Committee that the assets will not be transferred, directly or indirectly, to a listed individual, group, undertaking or entity, or otherwise used for terrorist purposes in line with Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), and decides further that such assets may only be unfrozen in the absence of an objection by a Committee member within thirty days of receiving the request, and stresses the exceptional nature of this provision, which shall not be considered as establishing a precedent;

“71. Calls upon the Committee when considering delisting requests to give due consideration to the opinions of designating State(s), State(s) of residence, nationality, location or incorporation, and other relevant States as determined by the Committee, directs Committee members to provide their reasons for objecting to delisting requests at the time the request is objected to, and requests the Committee to provide reasons to relevant Member States and national and regional courts and bodies, upon request and where appropriate;

“72. Encourages all Member States, including designating States and States of residence, nationality, location or incorporation to provide all information to the Committee relevant to the Committee’s review of delisting petitions, and to meet with the Committee, if requested, to convey their views on delisting requests, and further encourages the Committee, where appropriate, to meet with representatives of national or regional organizations and bodies that have relevant information on delisting petitions;

“73. Confirms that the Secretariat shall, within three days after a name is removed from the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, notify the Permanent Mission of the State(s) of residence, nationality, location or incorporation (to the extent this information is known), and recalls its decision that States receiving such notification shall take measures, in accordance with their domestic laws and practices, to notify or inform the concerned individual, group, undertaking or entity of the delisting in a timely manner;

“74. Reaffirms that, in cases in which the Ombudsperson is unable to interview a petitioner in his or her state of residence, the Ombudsperson may request, with the agreement of the petitioner, that the Committee consider granting exemptions to the restrictions on assets and travel in paragraphs 2 (a) and (b) of this resolution for the sole purpose of allowing the petitioner to meet travel expenses and travel to another State to be interviewed by the Ombudsperson for a period no longer than necessary to participate in this interview, provided that all States of transit and destination do not object to such travel, and further directs the Committee to notify the Ombudsperson of the Committee’s decision;

Exemptions/Focal Point

“75. Recalls that the assets freeze measures outlined in paragraph 2 above shall not apply to funds and other financial assets or economic resources that the Committee determines to be:

(a) necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges, or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or service charges for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or other financial assets or economic resources, following notification of intention to authorize access to such funds and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within 3 working days of the notification;

(b) necessary for extraordinary expenses, being expenses other than basic expenses, following notification of the intention to authorize release of such funds and approval of the Committee of the request within 5 working days of the notification;

“76. Reaffirms that the Focal Point mechanism established in resolution 1730 (2006) may:

(a) Receive requests from listed individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities for exemptions to the measures outlined in paragraph 2 (a) of this resolution, as defined in resolution 1452 (2002) provided that the request has first been submitted for the consideration of the State of residence, and reaffirms further that the Focal Point shall transmit such requests to the Committee for a decision, directs the Committee to consider such requests, including in consultation with the State of residence and any other relevant States, and further directs the Committee, through the Focal Point, to notify such individuals, groups, undertaking or entities of the Committee’s decision;

(b) Receive requests from listed individuals for exemptions to the measures outlined in paragraph 2 (b) of this resolution and transmit these to the Committee to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether entry or transit is justified, directs the Committee to consider such requests in consultation with States of transit and destination and any other relevant States, and reaffirms further that the Committee shall only agree to exemptions to the measures in paragraph 2 (b) of this resolution with the agreement of the States of transit and destination, and further directs the Committee, through the Focal Point, to notify such individuals of the Committee’s decision;

“77. Reaffirms that the Focal Point may receive, and transmit to the Committee for its consideration, communications from:

(a) individuals who have been removed from the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List;

(b) individuals claiming to have been subjected to the measures outlined in paragraph 2 above as a result of false or mistaken identification or confusion with individuals included on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List;

“78. Directs the Committee, with the assistance of the Monitoring Team and in consultation with relevant States, to carefully consider such communications and to respond, through the Focal Point, to such communications referred to in paragraph 77 (b), as may be appropriate, within 60 days, and further directs the Committee, in consultation with INTERPOL as may be appropriate, to communicate with Member States as may be appropriate to address possible or confirmed cases of false or mistaken identity or confusion with individuals included on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List;

Review and Maintenance of the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List

“79. Encourages all Member States, in particular designating States and States of residence, nationality, location or incorporation, to submit to the Committee additional identifying and other information, including where possible and in accordance with their national legislation, photographs and other biometric data of individuals along with supporting documentation, on listed individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, including updates on the operating status of listed entities, groups and undertakings, the movement, incarceration or death of listed individuals and other significant events, as such information becomes available;

“80. Requests the Monitoring Team to circulate to the Committee every twelve months a list compiled in consultation with the respective designating States and States of residence, nationality, location or incorporation, where known, of:

(a) individuals and entities on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List whose entries lack identifiers necessary to ensure effective implementation of the measures imposed upon them;

(b) individuals on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List who are reportedly deceased, along with an assessment of relevant information such as the certification of death, and to the extent possible, the status and location of frozen assets and the names of any individuals or entities who would be in a position to receive any unfrozen assets;

(c) entities on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List that are reported or confirmed to have ceased to exist, along with an assessment of any relevant information;

(d) any other names on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List that have not been reviewed in three or more years (“the triennial review”);

“81. Directs the Committee to review whether these listings remain appropriate, and further directs the Committee to remove listings if it decides they are no longer appropriate;

“82. Directs the Monitoring Team to refer to the Chair for review listings for which, after three years, no relevant State has responded in writing to the Committee’s requests for information, and in this regard, reminds the Committee that its Chair, acting in his or her capacity as Chair, may submit names for removal from the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, as appropriate and subject to the Committee’s normal decision-making procedures;

Coordination and Outreach

“83. Directs the Committee to continue to cooperate with other relevant Security Council Sanctions Committees, in particular those established pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009), 1988 (2011), 1970 (2011) and 2140 (2014);

“84. Reiterates the need to enhance ongoing cooperation among the Committee and United Nations counter-terrorism bodies, including the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), as well as their respective groups of experts, including through, as appropriate, enhanced information-sharing, coordination on visits to countries within their respective mandates, on facilitating and monitoring technical assistance, on relations with international and regional organizations and agencies and on other issues of relevance to these bodies;

“85. Encourages the Monitoring Team and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, to continue their joint activities, in cooperation with the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) and 1540 Committee experts to assist Member States in their efforts to comply with their obligations under the relevant resolutions, including through organizing regional and subregional workshops;

“86. Requests the Committee to consider, where and when appropriate, visits to selected countries by the Chair and/or Committee members to enhance the full and effective implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 2 above, with a view to encouraging States to comply fully with this resolution and resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1390 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1617 (2005), 1735 (2006), 1822 (2008), 1904 (2009) 1989 (2011), 2082 (2012), 2083 (2012), and 2133 (2014), 2178 (2014), 2195 (2014), 2199 (2015), and 2214 (2015);

“87. Requests the Committee to report orally, through its Chair, at least once per year, to the Council on the state of the overall work of the Committee and the Monitoring Team, and, as appropriate, in conjunction with other Committee Chairs, expresses its intention to hold informal consultations at least once per year on the work of the Committee, on the basis of reports from the Chair to the Council, and further requests the Chair to hold regular briefings for all interested Member States;

“88. Directs the Committee to consider requests for information from States and international organizations with ongoing judicial proceedings concerning implementation of the measures imposed in paragraph 2 above, and to respond as appropriate with additional information available to the Committee and the Monitoring Team;

Monitoring Team

“89. Decides, in order to assist the Committee in fulfilling its mandate, as well as to support the Ombudsperson, to extend the mandate of the current New York-based Monitoring Team and its members, established pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 1526 (2004), for a further period of twenty four months from the expiration of its current mandate in December 2017, under the direction of the Committee with the responsibilities outlined in annex I, and requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements to this effect, and highlights the importance of ensuring that the Monitoring Team receives the necessary administrative, security, and substantive support, to effectively, safely, and in a timely manner fulfil its mandate, including with regard to duty of care in high-risk environments, under the direction of the Committee, a subsidiary organ of the Security Council;

“90. Requests the Secretary-General to add up to two new experts on the Monitoring Team along with the additional administrative and analytical support resources needed to increase its capacity and strengthen its ability to analyse ISIL’s financing, radicalization and recruitment, and attack planning activities, as well as support the resulting increased activities of the Committee by the Secretariat, and notes that the selection process of these experts should prioritize appointing individuals with the strongest qualifications to fulfil the duties described above while paying due regard to the importance of regional and gender representation in the recruitment process;

“91. Directs the Monitoring Team, in its comprehensive, independent reports to the Committee referred to in paragraph (a) of Annex 1, to report on relevant thematic and regional topics and developing trends as may be requested by the Security Council or the Committee following the adoption of this resolution;

“92. Encourages relevant United Nations Missions, within their existing mandates, resources, and capabilities, to assist the Committee and the Monitoring Team, such as through logistical support, security assistance, and exchange of information in their work relevant to the threat by ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated groups and individuals in their respective areas of deployment;

“93. Directs the Monitoring Team to identify, gather information on, and keep the Committee informed of instances and common patterns of non-compliance with the measures imposed in this resolution, as well as to facilitate, upon request by Member States, assistance on capacity-building, requests the Monitoring Team to work closely with State(s) of residence, nationality, location or incorporation, designating States, other relevant States, and relevant United Nations Missions, and further directs the Monitoring Team to provide recommendations to the Committee on actions taken to respond to non-compliance;

“94. Directs the Committee, with the assistance of its Monitoring Team, to hold special meetings on important thematic or regional topics and Member States’ capacity challenges, in consultation, as appropriate, with the Counter Terrorism Committee and CTED, CTITF, and with the Financial Action Task Force to identify and prioritize areas for the provision of technical assistance to enable more effective implementation by Member States;

“95. Requests the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team to submit, in close collaboration with the CTED, to the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) in 30 days recommendations to the Committee on measures that can be taken to strengthen monitoring of global implementation of resolutions 2199 (2015) and 2178 (2014) and additional steps that could be taken by the Committee to improve global compliance with these resolutions;

“96. Requests the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team to provide the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) on a quarterly basis oral briefings on its analysis of global implementation of resolutions 2199 (2015) and 2178 (2014) including gathered information and analysis relevant to potential sanctions designations by Member States or Committee actions that could be taken;

ISIL Reporting

“97. Recalling the threat posed to international peace and security by ISIL and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities, requests the Secretary-General to provide an initial strategic-level report that demonstrates and reflects the gravity of the aforementioned threat, including foreign terrorist fighters joining ISIL and associated groups and entities, and the sources of financing of these groups including through illicit trade in oil, antiquities, and other natural resources, as well as their planning and facilitation of attacks, and reflects the range of UN efforts in support of Member States in countering this threat, in 45 days and provide updates every four months thereafter, with the input of CTED, in close collaboration with the Monitoring Team, as well as other relevant UN actors;

Reviews

“98. Decides to review the measures described in paragraph 2 above with a view to their possible further strengthening in eighteen months or sooner if necessary;

“99. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex I

“In accordance with paragraph 73 of this resolution, the Monitoring Team shall operate under the direction of the Committee and shall have the following mandates and responsibilities:

(a) To submit, in writing, comprehensive, independent reports to the Committee, every six months, the first by 30 June 2016, on the following issues:

(i) implementation by Member States of the measures referred to in paragraph 2 of this resolution;

(ii) the global threat posed by ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities, including (but not limited to) the threat posed by the presence of ISIL and its affiliates in Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic, Libya, and Afghanistan and the threats presented by the presence of Boko Haram;

(iii) the impact of the measures in resolution 2199 (2015), including progress on implementation of these measures, unintended consequences and unexpected challenges, as mandated in that resolution in the form of updates on each of the following subjects: oil trade; trade in cultural property; kidnapping for ransom and external donations; direct or indirect supply; sale or transfer of arms and related material of all types; as part of the impact assessment, pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 2199 (2015);

(iv) the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters recruited by or joining
Al-Qaida, ISIL, and all other associated groups, undertakings;

(v) any other issues that the Security Council or the Committee requests the Monitoring Team to include in its comprehensive reports as set forth in paragraph 91 of this resolution; and

(vi) specific recommendations related to improved implementation of relevant sanctions measures, including those referred to in paragraph 2 of this resolution, resolution 2178 (2014) and resolution 2199 (2015), and possible new measures;

(b) To assist the Ombudsperson in carrying out his or her mandate as specified in annex II of this resolution, including by providing updated information on those individuals, groups, undertakings or entities seeking their removal from the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List;

(c) To assist the Committee in regularly reviewing names on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, including by undertaking travel on behalf of the Committee, as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council and contact with Member States, with a view to developing the Committee’s record of the facts and circumstances relating to a listing;

(d) To assist the Committee in following up on requests to Member States for information, including with respect to implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 2 of this resolution;

(e) To submit a comprehensive programme of work to the Committee for its review and approval, as necessary, in which the Monitoring Team should detail the activities envisaged in order to fulfil its responsibilities, including proposed travel, based on close coordination with CTED and the 1540 Committee’s group of experts to avoid duplication and reinforce synergies;

(f) To work closely and share information with CTED and the 1540 Committee’s group of experts to identify areas of convergence and overlap and to help facilitate concrete coordination, including in the area of reporting, among the three Committees;

(g) To participate actively in and support all relevant activities under the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy including within the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, established to ensure overall coordination and coherence in the counter-terrorism efforts of the United Nations system, in particular through its relevant working groups;

(h) To gather information, on behalf of the Committee, on instances of reported non-compliance with the measures referred to in paragraph 2 of this resolution, including by collating information from all relevant sources, including Member States, and engaging with related parties, pursuing case studies, both on its own initiative and upon the Committee’s request, and to provide cases of non‑compliance and recommendations to the Committee on actions to respond to such cases of non-compliance for its review;

(i) To present to the Committee recommendations, which could be used by Member States to assist them with the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 2 of this resolution and in preparing proposed additions to the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List;

(j) To assist the Committee in its consideration of proposals for listing, including by compiling and circulating to the Committee information relevant to the proposed listing, and preparing a draft narrative summary referred to in paragraph 36 of this resolution;

(k) To consult with the Committee or any relevant Member States, as appropriate, when identifying that certain individuals or entities should be added to, or removed from, the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List;

(l) To bring to the Committee’s attention new or noteworthy circumstances that may warrant a delisting, such as publicly reported information on a deceased individual;

(m) To consult with Member States in advance of travel to selected Member States, based on its programme of work as approved by the Committee;

(n) To coordinate and cooperate with the national counter-terrorism focal point or similar coordinating body in the state of visit where appropriate;

(o) To cooperate closely with relevant United Nations counter-terrorism bodies in providing information on the measures taken by Member States on kidnapping and hostage-taking for ransom by Al-Qaida, ISIL, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities, and on relevant trends and developments in this area;

(p) To encourage Member States to submit names and additional identifying information for inclusion on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, as instructed by the Committee;

(q) To present to the Committee additional identifying and other information to assist the Committee in its efforts to keep the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List as updated and accurate as possible;

(r) To encourage Member States to provide information to the Monitoring Team that is relevant to the fulfilment of its mandate, as appropriate;

(s) To study and report to the Committee on the changing nature of the threat of Al-Qaida and ISIL, and the best measures to confront them, including by developing, within existing resources, a dialogue with relevant scholars, academic bodies and experts through an annual workshop and/or other appropriate means, in consultation with the Committee;

(t) To collate, assess, monitor, report on, and make recommendations regarding implementation of the measures, including implementation of the measure in paragraph 2 (a) of this resolution as it pertains to preventing the criminal misuse of the Internet by ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, which shall be included in the Monitoring Team’s regular report as outlined in section (a) of this Annex; to pursue case studies, as appropriate; and to explore in depth any other relevant issues as directed by the Committee;

(u) To consult with Member States and other relevant organizations, including the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the World Customs Organization (WCO), INTERPOL, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and its regional bodies as well as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), including regular dialogue with representatives in New York and in capitals, taking into account their comments, especially regarding any issues that might be reflected in the Monitoring Team’s reports referred to in paragraph (a) of this annex, such as gaps and challenges in States’ implementation of the measures in this resolution;

(v) To consult, in confidence, with Member States’ intelligence and security services, including through regional forums, in order to facilitate the sharing of information and to strengthen implementation of the measures;

(w) To consult with Member States, relevant representatives of the private sector, including financial institutions and relevant non-financial businesses and professions, and international and regional organizations, including FATF and its regional bodies, to promote awareness of, and enhanced compliance with, and to learn about the practical implementation of the asset freeze and to develop recommendations for the strengthening of the implementation of that measure;

(x) To consult with Member States, relevant representatives of the private sector and international and regional organizations, including ICAO, IATA, WCO and INTERPOL, to promote awareness of, and enhanced compliance with, and to learn about the practical implementation of the travel ban, including the use of advanced passenger information provided by civil aircraft operators to Member States, and to develop recommendations for the strengthening of the implementation of that measure;

(y) To consult with Member States, relevant representatives of international and regional organizations and the private sector, in coordination with national authorities, as appropriate, to promote awareness of, enhance compliance with, and to learn about the practical implementation of the arms embargo, with a particular emphasis on measures to counter the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by listed individuals, groups, undertakings and entities and the procurement of related components used to construct IEDs, in particular (but not limited to) trigger mechanisms, explosive precursors, commercial grade explosives, detonators, detonating cords, or poisons;

(z) To assist the Committee in facilitating assistance on capacity-building for enhancing implementation of the measures, upon request by Member States;

(aa) To work with INTERPOL and Member States to obtain photographs and, in accordance with their national legislation, biometric information of listed individuals for possible inclusion in INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices, to work with INTERPOL to ensure that INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices exist for all listed individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities; and to further work with INTERPOL, as appropriate, to address possible or confirmed cases of false or mistaken identify, with a view to reporting to the Committee on such instances and proposing any recommendations;

(bb) To assist other subsidiary bodies of the Security Council, and their expert panels, upon request, with enhancing their cooperation with INTERPOL, referred to in resolution 1699 (2006), and to work, in consultation with the Secretariat, to standardize the format of all United Nations sanctions lists and the Consolidated Sanctions List so as to facilitate implementation by national authorities;

(cc) To report to the Committee, on a regular basis or when the Committee so requests, through oral and/or written briefings on the work of the Monitoring Team, including its visits to Member States and its activities;

(dd) Any other responsibility identified by the Committee.

Annex II

“In accordance with paragraph 54 of this resolution, the Office of the Ombudsperson shall be authorized to carry out the following tasks upon receipt of a delisting request submitted by, or on behalf of, an individual, group, undertaking or entity on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List or by the legal representative or estate of such individual, group, undertaking or entity (“the petitioner”).

“The Council recalls that Member States are not permitted to submit delisting petitions on behalf of an individual, group, undertaking or entity to the Office of the Ombudsperson.

Information Gathering (Four Months)

“1. Upon receipt of a delisting request, the Ombudsperson shall:

(a) Acknowledge to the petitioner the receipt of the delisting request;

(b) Inform the petitioner of the general procedure for processing delisting requests;

(c) Answer specific questions from the petitioner about Committee procedures;

(d) Inform the petitioner in case the petition fails to properly address the original listing criteria, as set forth in paragraph 2 of this resolution, and return it to the petitioner for his or her consideration; and

(e) Verify if the request is a new request or a repeated request and, if it is a repeated request to the Ombudsperson and it does not contain relevant additional information, return it to the petitioner, with an appropriate explanation, for his or her consideration.

“2. For delisting petitions not returned to the petitioner, the Ombudsperson shall immediately forward the delisting request to the members of the Committee, designating State(s), State(s) of residence and nationality or incorporation, relevant United Nations bodies, and any other States deemed relevant by the Ombudsperson. The Ombudsperson shall ask these States or relevant United Nations bodies to provide, within four months, any appropriate additional information relevant to the delisting request. The Ombudsperson may engage in dialogue with these States to determine:

(a) These States’ opinions on whether the delisting request should be granted; and

(b) Information, questions or requests for clarifications that these States would like to be communicated to the petitioner regarding the delisting request, including any information or steps that might be taken by a petitioner to clarify the delisting request.

“3. Where all designating States consulted by the Ombudsperson do not object to the petitioner’s delisting, the Ombudsperson may shorten the information gathering period, as appropriate.

“4. The Ombudsperson shall also immediately forward the delisting request to the Monitoring Team, which shall provide to the Ombudsperson, within four months:

(a) All information available to the Monitoring Team that is relevant to the delisting request, including court decisions and proceedings, news reports, and information that States or relevant international organizations have previously shared with the Committee or the Monitoring Team;

(b) Fact-based assessments of the information provided by the petitioner that is relevant to the delisting request; and

(c) Questions or requests for clarifications that the Monitoring Team would like asked of the petitioner regarding the delisting request.

“5. At the end of this four-month period of information gathering, the Ombudsperson shall present a written update to the Committee on progress to date, including details regarding which States have supplied information, and any significant challenges encountered therein. The Ombudsperson may extend this period once for up to two months if he or she assesses that more time is required for information gathering, giving due consideration to requests by Member States for additional time to provide information.

Dialogue (Two Months)

“6. Upon completion of the information gathering period, the Ombudsperson shall facilitate a two-month period of engagement, which may include dialogue with the petitioner. Giving due consideration to requests for additional time, the Ombudsperson may extend this period once for up to two months if he or she assesses that more time is required for engagement and the drafting of the Comprehensive Report described in paragraph 8 below. The Ombudsperson may shorten this time period if he or she assesses less time is required.

“7. During this period of engagement, the Ombudsperson:

(a) May submit questions, either orally or in writing, to the petitioner, or request additional information or clarifications that may help the Committee’s consideration of the request, including any questions or information requests received from relevant States, the Committee and the Monitoring Team;

(b) Should request from the petitioner a signed statement in which the petitioner declares that they have no ongoing association with Al-Qaida, ISIL, or any cell, affiliate, splinter group, or derivative thereof, and undertakes not to associate with Al-Qaida or ISIL in the future;

(c) Should meet with the petitioner, to the extent possible;

(d) Shall forward replies from the petitioner back to relevant States, the Committee and the Monitoring Team and follow up with the petitioner in connection with incomplete responses by the petitioner;

(e) Shall coordinate with States, the Committee and the Monitoring Team regarding any further inquiries of, or response to, the petitioner;

(f) During the information gathering or dialogue phase, the Ombudsperson may share with relevant States information provided by a State, including that State’s position on the delisting request, if the State which provided the information consents;

(g) In the course of the information gathering and dialogue phases and in the preparation of the report, the Ombudsperson shall not disclose any information shared by a state on a confidential basis, without the express written consent of that state; and

(h) During the dialogue phase, the Ombudsperson shall give serious consideration to the opinions of designating States, as well as other Member States that come forward with relevant information, in particular those Member States most affected by acts or associations that led to the original listing.

“8. Upon completion of the period of engagement described above, the Ombudsperson, with the help of the Monitoring Team, as appropriate, shall draft and circulate to the Committee a Comprehensive Report that will exclusively:

(a) Summarize and, as appropriate, specify the sources of, all information available to the Ombudsperson that is relevant to the delisting request. The report shall respect confidential elements of Member States’ communications with the Ombudsperson;

(b) Describe the Ombudsperson’s activities with respect to this delisting request, including dialogue with the petitioner; and

(c) Based on an analysis of all the information available to the Ombudsperson and the Ombudsperson’s recommendation, lay out for the Committee the principal arguments concerning the delisting request. The recommendation should state the Ombudsperson’s views with respect to the listing as of the time of the examination of the delisting request.

Committee Discussion

“9. After the Committee has had fifteen days to review the Comprehensive Report in all official languages of the United Nations, the Chair of the Committee shall place the delisting request on the Committee’s agenda for consideration.

“10. When the Committee considers the delisting request, the Ombudsperson, shall present the Comprehensive Report in person and answer Committee members’ questions regarding the request.

“11. Committee consideration of the Comprehensive Report shall be completed no later than thirty days from the date the Comprehensive Report is submitted to the Committee for its review.

“12. After the Committee has completed its consideration of the Comprehensive Report, the Ombudsperson may notify all relevant States of the recommendation.

“13. Upon the request of a designating State, State of nationality, residence, or incorporation, and with the approval of the Committee, the Ombudsperson may provide a copy of the Comprehensive Report, with any redactions deemed necessary by the Committee, to such States, along with a notification to such States confirming that:

(a) All decisions to release information from the Ombudsperson’s Comprehensive Reports, including the scope of information, are made by the Committee at its discretion and on a case-by-case basis;

(b) The Comprehensive Report reflects the basis for the Ombudsperson’s recommendation and is not attributable to any individual Committee member; and

(c) The Comprehensive Report, and any information contained therein, should be treated as strictly confidential and not shared with the petitioner or any other Member State without the approval of the Committee.

“14. In cases where the Ombudsperson recommends retaining the listing, the requirement for States to take the measures in paragraph 2 of this resolution shall remain in place with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity, unless a Committee member submits a delisting request, which the Committee shall consider under its normal consensus procedures.

“15. In cases where the Ombudsperson recommends that the Committee consider delisting, the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 2 of this resolution shall terminate with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity 60 days after the Committee completes consideration of a Comprehensive Report of the Ombudsperson, in accordance with this annex II, including paragraph 7 (h), unless the Committee decides by consensus before the end of that 60-day period that the requirement shall remain in place with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity; provided that, in cases where consensus does not exist, the Chair shall, on the request of a Committee Member, submit the question of whether to delist that individual, group, undertaking or entity to the Security Council for a decision within a period of 60 days; and provided further that, in the event of such a request, the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 2 of this resolution shall remain in force for that period with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity until the question is decided by the Security Council.

“16. Following the conclusion of the process described in paragraphs 55 and 56 of this resolution, the Committee shall convey to the Ombudsperson, within 60 days, whether the measures described in paragraph 2 are to be retained or terminated, setting out reasons and including any further relevant information, and an updated narrative summary of reasons for listing, where appropriate, for the Ombudsperson to transmit to the petitioner. The 60-day deadline applies to outstanding matters before the Ombudsperson or the Committee and will take effect from the adoption of this resolution.

“17. After the Ombudsperson receives the communication from the committee under paragraph 28, if the measures in paragraph 2 are to be retained, the Ombudsperson shall send to the petitioner, with an advance copy sent to the Committee, a letter that:

(a) Communicates the outcome of the petition;

(b) Describes, to the extent possible and drawing upon the Ombudsperson’s Comprehensive Report, the process and publicly releasable factual information gathered by the Ombudsperson; and

(c) Forwards from the Committee all information about the decision provided to the Ombudsperson pursuant to paragraph 28 above.

“18. In all communications with the petitioner, the Ombudsperson shall respect the confidentiality of Committee deliberations and confidential communications between the Ombudsperson and Member States.

“19. The Ombudsperson may notify the petitioner, as well as those States relevant to a case but which are not members of the Committee, of the stage at which the process has reached.

Other Office of the Ombudsperson Tasks

“20. In addition to the tasks specified above, the Ombudsperson shall:

(a) Distribute publicly releasable information about Committee procedures, including Committee Guidelines, fact sheets and other Committee-prepared documents;

(b) Where address is known, notify individuals or entities about the status of their listing, after the Secretariat has officially notified the Permanent Mission of the State or States, pursuant to paragraph 53 of this resolution; and

(c) Submit biannual reports summarizing the activities of the Ombudsperson to the Security Council.”

AFP, December 18, 2015、AP, December 18, 2015、ARA News, December 18, 2015、Champress, December 18, 2015、al-Hayat, December 19, 2015、Iraqi News, December 18, 2015、Kull-na Shuraka’, December 18, 2015、al-Mada Press, December 18, 2015、Naharnet, December 18, 2015、NNA, December 18, 2015、Reuters, December 18, 2015、SANA, December 18, 2015、UPI, December 18, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

シリア軍がアレッポ県、ハマー県、ラタキア県で反体制武装集団との戦闘を続ける(2015年12月17日)

アレッポ県では、シリア人権監視団によると、シリア軍、国防隊、ヒズブッラー戦闘員、アラブ系・アジア系外国人戦闘員が、ジュンド・アクサー機構、トルキスターン・イスラーム党、シャーム自由人イスラーム運動などからなるジハード主義武装集団とアレッポ市南部郊外で交戦した。

この戦闘で、イドリブ県のワーリーを務めるシャーム自由人イスラーム運動の幹部が死亡したという。

またロシア軍と思われる戦闘機がアアザーズ市各所を空爆し、住民7人が死亡した。

他方、SANA(12月17日付)によると、シリア軍がハーン・アサル村、アレッポ市ライラムーン地区、フィルドゥース地区、バニー・ザイド地区、マアスラーニーヤ地区、シャイフ・ルトフィー地区、ブスターン・バーシャー地区でシャームの民のヌスラ戦線などからなるジハード主義武装集団と交戦し、複数の戦闘員を殺傷、拠点・装備を破壊した。

**

ハマー県では、シリア人権監視団によると、シリア軍がマンスーラ村、タッル・ワースィト村を砲撃するなか、ロシア軍と思われる戦闘機がカフルズィーター市を空爆した。

これに対して、ジハード主義武装集団は、ムハルダ市各所を砲撃した。

さらに、サルマーニーヤ村一帯では、シリア軍、国防隊とジハード主義武装集団が交戦した。

**

ラタキア県では、シリア人権監視団によると、シリア軍、国防隊、ヒズブッラー戦闘員、アラブ系・アジア系外国人戦闘員が、シャームの民のヌスラ戦線、トルキスターン・イスラーム党などからなるジハード主義武装集団と県北部の山岳地帯各所で交戦した。

一方、SANA(12月17日付)によると、シリア軍が人民防衛諸集団とともに、県北部のサイイド山で、反体制武装集団の全拠点を破壊し、同地を完全制圧した。

**

ダマスカス郊外県では、シリア人権監視団によると、シリア軍が奪還したマルジュ・スルターン村一帯で、シリア軍、国防隊が、アル=カーイダ系組織のシャームの民のヌスラ戦線、サウジアラビアでの反体制派合同会合に参加したシャーム自由人イスラーム運動およびイスラーム軍などからなる合同作戦司令室と交戦し、後者がマルジュ・スルターン村一帯の複数の拠点を奪還した。

またドゥーマー市ではシリア軍による狙撃で男性1人が死亡した。

一方、西グータ地方で活動するバヤーリク・シャーム旅団はビデオ声明を出し、フルカーン旅団に編入し活動を継続すると発表した。

**

ダルアー県では、SANA(12月17日付)によると、シリア軍がダルアー市避難民キャンプ一帯、マンシヤ地区南部、ブスラー広場南東部でシャームの民のヌスラ戦線などからなるジハード主義武装集団を攻撃し、

**

ヒムス県では、SANA(12月17日付)によると、シリア軍がガースィビーヤ村、ティールマアッラ村、南マシュジャル村でシャームの民のヌスラ戦線などからなるジハード主義武装集団と交戦し、複数の戦闘員を殺傷、拠点・装備を破壊した。

一方、クッルナー・シュラカー(12月18日付)によると、ヒムス市アクラマ地区とファーラービー通りの2カ所で仕掛け爆弾が爆発した(死傷者でなかった)。
これに関して、アル=カーイダ系組織のシャームの民のヌスラ戦線に所属するアビー・ズバイル・ヒムスィー大隊はSNSを通じて犯行声明を出した。

**

NNA(12月17日付)によると、レバノンのベカーア県バアルベック郡アルサール村郊外のワーディー・フマイドで、レバノン軍がシリアの反体制武装集団を要撃し、アル=カーイダ系組織のシャームの民のヌスラ戦線のメンバー2人を殺害した。

AFP, December 17, 2015、AP, December 17, 2015、ARA News, December 17, 2015、Champress, December 17, 2015、al-Hayat, December 18, 2015、Iraqi News, December 17, 2015、Kull-na Shuraka’, December 17, 2015、December 18, 2015、al-Mada Press, December 17, 2015、Naharnet, December 17, 2015、NNA, December 17, 2015、Reuters, December 17, 2015、SANA, December 17, 2015、UPI, December 17, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

アレッポ県、ヒムス県などでシリア軍がダーイシュ(イスラーム国)との戦闘を続ける一方、ヤルムーク殉教者旅団がヌスラ戦線メンバーを処刑(2015年12月17日)

アレッポ県では、SANA(12月17日付)によると、シリア軍がナッジャーラ村、ジャービリーヤ村でダーイシュ(イスラーム国)の拠点を攻撃し、複数の戦闘員を殺傷、拠点・装備を破壊した。

**

ダイル・ザウル県では、シリア人権監視団によると、ヤマーディーン市郊外の砂漠で、ダーイシュ(イスラーム国)に処刑されたと思われる遺体10体が発見された。

**

アレッポ県では、シリア人権監視団によると、ロシア軍と思われる戦闘機がダーイシュ(イスラーム国)の主要拠点の一つバーブ市を空爆し、子供3人と女性3人を含む11人が死亡した。

**

スワイダー県では、SANA(12月17日付)によると、シリア軍がブサイナ丘東部一帯でダーイシュ(イスラーム国)と交戦し、複数の戦闘員を殺傷、拠点・装備を破壊した。

**

ヒムス県では、SANA(12月17日付)によると、シリア軍がタドムル市一帯、ハドス村、カルヤタイン市、マヒーン町でダーイシュ(イスラーム国)の拠点を空爆し、複数の戦闘員を殺傷、拠点・装備を破壊した。

シリア軍はまた、ワーディー・ザカーラ、ウンム・ダバービール村、タドムリーヤ村、ジュッブ・ハマド村、ラッフーム村でダーイシュの拠点を攻撃し、複数の戦闘員を殺傷、拠点・装備を破壊した。

**

ダルアー県では、クッルナー・シュラカー(12月17日付)によると、ダーイシュ(イスラーム国)に忠誠を誓うヤルムーク殉教者旅団が、アル=カーイダ系組織のシャームの民のヌスラ戦線メンバー3人を処刑した。

処刑は、ヤルムーク殉教者旅団の司令官アブー・アリー・バリーディー氏暗殺への報復だという。

**

ラッカ県では、シリア人権監視団によると、ロシア軍と思われる戦闘機がダーイシュ(イスラーム国)の中心拠点ラッカ市を空爆し、子供2人と女性2人を含む住民12人が死亡した。

AFP, December 17, 2015、AP, December 17, 2015、ARA News, December 17, 2015、Champress, December 17, 2015、al-Hayat, December 18, 2015、December 19, 2015、Iraqi News, December 17, 2015、Kull-na Shuraka’, December 17, 2015、al-Mada Press, December 17, 2015、Naharnet, December 17, 2015、NNA, December 17, 2015、Reuters, December 17, 2015、SANA, December 17, 2015、UPI, December 17, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

ハサカ県カーミシュリー市で国防隊隊員ら2人殺害、遺族はアサーイシュの犯行と非難(2015年12月17日)

ハサカ県では、シリア人権監視団によると、カーミシュリー市ハリージュ地区で、国防隊隊員1人を含む2人が殺害された。

殺害された2人の遺族は、西クルディスタン移行期民政局アサーイシュが2人を狙って殺害したと主張しているという。

なお、カーミシュリー市では15~16日、アサーイシュ(ロージュ・アーヴァー・トラフィック)および人民防衛隊とシリア軍、治安機関、国防隊の間で緊張が高まっていた(https://syriaarabspring.info/?p=24954)。

AFP, December 17, 2015、AP, December 17, 2015、ARA News, December 17, 2015、Champress, December 17, 2015、al-Hayat, December 18, 2015、Iraqi News, December 17, 2015、Kull-na Shuraka’, December 17, 2015、al-Mada Press, December 17, 2015、Naharnet, December 17, 2015、NNA, December 17, 2015、Reuters, December 17, 2015、SANA, December 17, 2015、UPI, December 17, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

シリア政府との交渉にあたる反体制派統一代表団の人選を行うための最高交渉委員会がリヤドでの会合でヒジャーブ元首相を委員長に選出(2015年12月17日)

サウジアラビアの首都リヤドでの反体制派合同会合(8~10日)で新設されたシリア政府との交渉にあたる反体制派統一代表団の人選を行うための最高交渉委員会(34人)が、リヤドで初の会合を開いた。

会合は2日間の予定で、イスラーム軍やアル=カーイダ系組織のシャーム自由人イスラーム運動の代表11人が参加した。

会合では、リヤード・ヒジャーブ元首相を最高交渉委員会の委員長(総合調整役)に選出した。

『ハヤート』(12月18日付)によると、ヒジャーブ元首相は34人の委員のうちの25人の賛成票を獲得して、委員長に選出された。

また会合では、最高交渉委員会を「政治組織」とせず、シリア政府との代表団の選出という限定的な目的のみを遂行する組織とすることを合意した。

**

なお『ハヤート』(12月17日付)などは、19日の閉幕時に採択予定の声明案において、アサド大統領と今後いかなる調整も拒否することや、全権を有する移行期統治機関の詳細な内容が盛り込まれており、これが採択されれば、10日の合同会合で採択された声明における基本方針が大幅に修正されることになると報じていた。

だが、リヤドでの反体制派合同会合のスポークスマンを務めていたリヤード・ナアサーン・アーガー氏は、クッルナー・シュラカー(12月17日付)に対して「いかなる修正もない」と述べ、これを否定した。

AFP, December 17, 2015、AP, December 17, 2015、ARA News, December 17, 2015、Champress, December 17, 2015、al-Hayat, December 18, 2015、Iraqi News, December 17, 2015、Kull-na Shuraka’, December 17, 2015、al-Mada Press, December 17, 2015、Naharnet, December 17, 2015、NNA, December 17, 2015、Reuters, December 17, 2015、SANA, December 17, 2015、UPI, December 17, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

ロシアのプーチン大統領「アサド政権は、米国が提案する安保理決議が自分たちにとって好ましいものでなかったとしても、受け入れるべき」(2015年12月17日)

ロシアのヴラジミール・プーチン大統領はモスクワで年末の大規模記者会見を開催し、18日にニューヨークで開催予定の「国際シリア支援グループ」(ISSG)の外相級会合後に、米国が国連安保理に提案予定のシリア紛争終結に向けた決議(案)を支持する方針であることを明言した。

プーチン大統領はまた、アサド大統領に対して、この決議(案)において盛り込まれるであろうシリア紛争の解決策が「好ましくない」ものであっても受け入れるよう呼びかけた。

プーチン大統領は「我々に(紛争解決の)計画はあるかと言えばある。それは、ほぼすべての点において、米国が示した計画と合致している…。シリア政府は国連で承認されるであろう決議が、たとえ自分たちにとって好ましくないものだったとしても、受け入れるべきだ」と述べた。

プーチン大統領は16日、モスクワでジョン・ケリー米国務長官と会談し、シリア情勢、ウクライナ情勢について意見を交わし、またこの会談後、18日のニューヨークでの会合へのセルゲイ・ラブロフ外務大臣の参加を決定していた。

16日のケリー米国務長官との会談に関して、プーチン大統領は、シリア紛争の解決に向けた国連安保理決議の提案・採決などにバラク・オバマ大統領の提案について、米国と相互理解が得られたことを明らかにしたうえで、「ロシアは米国の提案におけるもっとも重要な点を支持している。それは、最終的なかたちにするための若干の取り組みを必要とするが、穏健であり、受け入れ得るものだ」と述べた。

そのうえで「いかなる武力紛争であっても…、すべての当事者が中庸を受け入れることが求められる」と強調した。

一方、トルコとの関係については、ロシア軍戦闘機撃墜が「敵対行為」だと批判、「彼らは我々が逃げ去ると思っていたが、ロシアはそのようなことは決してしない。我々はプレゼンスを強化し、さらなる戦闘機、地対空ミサイル・システムS-400、地対空ミサイル・システム「ブーク」を配備した…。トルコ軍はシリア領空を旋回してみるがいい」と述べた。

**

RT(12月17日付)は、ヨルダン政府がロシアに対して、シリア国内で「テロ活動に関与していると疑われる」160の組織のリストを提示した、と伝えた。

AFP, December 17, 2015、AP, December 17, 2015、ARA News, December 17, 2015、Champress, December 17, 2015、al-Hayat, December 18, 2015、Iraqi News, December 17, 2015、Kull-na Shuraka’, December 17, 2015、al-Mada Press, December 17, 2015、Naharnet, December 17, 2015、NNA, December 17, 2015、Reuters, December 17, 2015、RT, December 17, 2015、SANA, December 17, 2015、UPI, December 17, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

米国がYPG主体のシリア民主軍所属のアラブ人武装勢力に新たに武器弾薬支援(2015年12月17日)

『ハヤート』(12月18日付)は、米国の複数の匿名高官の話として、米軍がシリア国内でダーイシュ(イスラーム国)と戦う反体制武装集団のうち、アラブ人武装勢力(西クルディスタン移行期民政局(ロジャヴァ)人民防衛隊(YPG)主体のシリア民主軍に参加する部族民兵)に対して新たに武器弾薬を供与したと伝えた。

同高官によると、この増援は数日前にシリア北東部で活動するアラブ人武装勢力に対して陸路で提供されたという。

AFP, December 17, 2015、AP, December 17, 2015、ARA News, December 17, 2015、Champress, December 17, 2015、al-Hayat, December 18, 2015、Iraqi News, December 17, 2015、Kull-na Shuraka’, December 17, 2015、al-Mada Press, December 17, 2015、Naharnet, December 17, 2015、NNA, December 17, 2015、Reuters, December 17, 2015、SANA, December 17, 2015、UPI, December 17, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

「穏健な反体制派」はロシアからの武器弾薬物資供与・支援を「嘘」だと全否定(2015年12月17日)

イドリブ県で活動する「北部師団」を名乗る武装集団のアスアド・ハンナー氏(政治局メンバー)や第13師団のアフマド・サウード報道官は、「ロシアはシリア軍と連携する自由シリア軍に武器弾薬物資を供与し、支援している」とのヴラジミール・プーチン大統領の発言(11日付)に関して、AFP(12月17日付)に対して「嘘」だと全否定した。

なお、「北部師団」は12月9日に、フルカーン・ハック旅団と第101師団が統合して結成した武装集団。

AFP, December 17, 2015、AP, December 17, 2015、ARA News, December 17, 2015、Champress, December 17, 2015、al-Hayat, December 18, 2015、Iraqi News, December 17, 2015、Kull-na Shuraka’, December 17, 2015、al-Mada Press, December 17, 2015、al-Mudun, December 9, 2015、Naharnet, December 17, 2015、NNA, December 17, 2015、Reuters, December 17, 2015、SANA, December 17, 2015、UPI, December 17, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

米軍主導の有志連合はシリア国内で7回の爆撃を実施(2015年12月16日)

米中央軍(CENTCOM)は、12月16日にシリア、イラク領内のダーイシュ(イスラーム国)拠点などに対して18回の空爆を行ったと発表した。

このうちシリア領内での空爆は7回、ラッカ市近郊(3回)、フール町近郊(1回)、マンビジュ市近郊(2回)、マーリア市近郊(1回)のダーイシュに対して攻撃が行われた。

CENTCOM, December 17, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

ロシア軍機がアレッポ県のダーイシュ(イスラーム国)の拠点都市マンビジュ市一帯を爆撃し、住民約50人死亡(2015年12月16日)

アレッポ県では、クッルナー・シュラカー(12月16日付)によると、ロシア軍戦闘機がダーイシュ(イスラーム国)の拠点都市の一つバーブ市を空爆し、住民8人が死亡、数十人が負傷した。

ロシア軍戦闘機はまた、マンビジュ市郊外のマスカナ市の市場を空爆し、住民40人以上が死亡、数十人が負傷した。

アレッポ県では、SANA(12月16日付)によると、シリア軍がシャワーヤー丘、アイユーブ丘、ワディーア村、マンビジュ市でダーイシュ(イスラーム国)の拠点を攻撃し、複数の戦闘員を殺傷、拠点・装備を破壊した。

一方、ARA News(12月16日付)によると、米トルコが設置合意した「安全地帯」でシャーム戦線とダーイシュ(イスラーム国)が拠点都市のマーリア市内で交戦した。

**

ヒムス県では、SANA(12月16日付)によると、シリア軍がタドムル市郊外のタール山などでダーイシュ(イスラーム国)の拠点を攻撃し、複数の戦闘員を殺傷、拠点・装備を破壊した。

**

ラッカ県では、ダーイシュ(イスラーム国)の通信部門アアマーク通信が、ラッカ市各所へのロシア軍の空爆で、女性、子供、負傷者を含む住民21人が死亡、11人が負傷したと報じ、その写真を公開した。

AFP, December 16, 2015、AP, December 16, 2015、ARA News, December 16, 2015、Champress, December 16, 2015、al-Hayat, December 17, 2015、Iraqi News, December 16, 2015、Kull-na Shuraka’, December 16, 2015、December 17, 2015、al-Mada Press, December 16, 2015、Naharnet, December 16, 2015、NNA, December 16, 2015、Reuters, December 16, 2015、SANA, December 16, 2015、UPI, December 16, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

シリア軍がヌスラ戦線、トルコマン・イスラーム党との戦闘の末、トルコ国境に近いヌーバ山を完全制圧(2015年12月16日)

ラタキア県では、シリア人権監視団によると、シリア軍、ヒズブッラー、国防隊などの民兵が、シャームの民のヌスラ戦線、トルキスターン・イスラーム党などからなるジハード主義武装集団と交戦の末、ヌーバ山一帯を制圧した。

戦闘と並行して、クルド山、トルクメン山一帯に激しい空爆が行われた。

一方、SANA(12月16日付)によると、シリア軍が国防隊とともに、県北部のヌーバ山で反体制武装集団の全拠点を破壊し、同地を完全制圧した。

**

ハマー県では、ドゥラル・シャーミーヤ(12月16日付)によると、反体制武装集団がカフルヌブーダ町、ジャナービラ村、ウスマーン丘、カルアト・マディーク町、でシリア軍と交戦、またクッルナー・シュラカー(12月16日付)によると、反体制武装集団(アル=カーイダ系組織のジュンド・アクサー機構)がフワイル丘を制圧した。

一方、SANA(12月16日付)によると、シリア軍はラタキア県、イドリブ県との県境に位置するサルマーニーヤ村近郊のシール・サッハーブと第793地点で反体制武装集団を掃討し、同地を完全制圧した。

シリア軍はまた、タマーニア町、フバイト村、ムーリク市でシャーム自由人イスラーム運動、ジュンド・アクサー機構などジハード主義武装手段の拠点を攻撃し、戦闘員24人を殲滅した。

**

ヒムス県では、SANA(12月16日付)によると、シリア軍がタルビーサ市各所でシャームの民のヌスラ戦線などからなるジハード主義武装集団の拠点を攻撃し、複数の戦闘員を殺傷、拠点・装備を破壊した。

**

ダルアー県では、SANA(12月16日付)によると、シリア軍がダルアー市アッバースィーヤ地区など各所でシャームの民のヌスラ戦線傘下の南部タウヒード旅団、ハウラーン・ムジャーヒディーン大隊、スジャイル砲兵大隊などと交戦し、複数の戦闘員を殺傷、拠点・装備を破壊した。

一方、クッルナー・シュラカー(12月16日付)によると、ハウラーン法務局のウサーマ・ヤティーム裁判長の爆殺を受け、同法務局はイスマト・アブスィー氏を新裁判長に任命した。

**

イドリブ県では、SANA(12月16日付)によると、シリア軍がアブー・マッキー村で反体制武装集団の拠点を攻撃し、複数の戦闘員を殺傷、拠点・装備を破壊した。

**

アレッポ県では、クッルナー・シュラカー(12月16日付)によると、シリア軍、イラク人・イラン人民兵がアレッポ市南部郊外に位置する反体制武装集団の拠点ズィルバ村への突入を試みたが、反体制武装集団はこれを撃退した。

一方、SANA(12月16日付)によると、シリア軍がアレッポ市アグユール地区、旧市街、サラーフッディーン地区、サーリヒーン地区、スッカリー地区、シャイフ・サイード地区でシャームの民のヌスラ戦線などからなるジハード主義武装集団と交戦し、複数の戦闘員を殺傷、拠点・装備を破壊した。

AFP, December 16, 2015、AP, December 16, 2015、ARA News, December 16, 2015、Champress, December 16, 2015、al-Durar al-Shamiya, December 16, 2015、al-Hayat, December 17, 2015、Iraqi News, December 16, 2015、Kull-na Shuraka’, December 16, 2015、al-Mada Press, December 16, 2015、Naharnet, December 16, 2015、NNA, December 16, 2015、Reuters, December 16, 2015、SANA, December 16, 2015、UPI, December 16, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

シリア軍報道官「9~15日までの7日間でシリア軍機は193回出撃し、テロリストの拠点563カ所を破壊」(2015年12月16日)

シリア軍報道官は声明を出し、12月9日から15日までの7日間で、シリア軍機の出撃回数が193回に達し、ダマスカス郊外県、ヒムス県、ハマー県、イドリブ県、アレッポ県、ダイル・ザウル県、ラタキア県のテロリストの拠点563カ所を破壊したと発表した。

AFP, December 16, 2015、AP, December 16, 2015、ARA News, December 16, 2015、Champress, December 16, 2015、al-Hayat, December 17, 2015、Iraqi News, December 16, 2015、Kull-na Shuraka’, December 16, 2015、al-Mada Press, December 16, 2015、Naharnet, December 16, 2015、NNA, December 16, 2015、Reuters, December 16, 2015、SANA, December 16, 2015、UPI, December 16, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

ハサカ県カーミシュリー市で西クルディスタン移行期民政局アサーイシュがシリア軍、治安部隊、国防隊隊員21人を逮捕(2015年12月16日)

ハサカ県では、ARA News(12月16日付)によると、西クルディスタン移行期民政局アサーイシュがカーミシュリー市でシリア軍兵士、治安部隊隊員、および国防隊隊員21人を逮捕した。

アサーイシュ総司令部が出した声明によると、この措置は、ダマスカス国際空港およびカーミシュリー空港で、「独裁的なシリア政府」が徴兵を口実に西クルディスタン移行期民政局の住民に対して行った「行き過ぎた行為」に対処するものだという。

同声明によると、15日晩には、内務省総合情報部の隊員1人がカーミシュリー市内で「ロージュ・アーヴァー・トラフィック」(アサーイシュのパトロール隊)車輌に発砲、これを受け、アサーイシュが総合情報部隊員1人を含む10人を同日中に逮捕したという。

これに対して16日、国防隊が「ロージュ・アーヴァー・トラフィック」隊員2人を報復として拘束するとともに、ワフダ通りでアサーイシュの「ロージュ・アーヴァー・トラフィック」を要撃、これに対してアサーイシュが応戦し、国防隊員11人を逮捕したという。

AFP, December 16, 2015、AP, December 16, 2015、ARA News, December 16, 2015、Champress, December 16, 2015、al-Hayat, December 17, 2015、Iraqi News, December 16, 2015、Kull-na Shuraka’, December 16, 2015、al-Mada Press, December 16, 2015、Naharnet, December 16, 2015、NNA, December 16, 2015、Reuters, December 16, 2015、SANA, December 16, 2015、UPI, December 16, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.

ロシア外務省報道官「ウィーンでの合意に従って、2016年1月1日にニューヨークでシリア政府と反体制派の交渉を開始する」(2015年12月16日)

ロシア外務省のマリア・ザハロワ報道官は、ウィーン・プロセスが定めているシリア政府と反体制派の統一代表団の和平交渉に関して、ニューヨークで2016年1月1日に開始されると発表した。

この発表は、ジョン・ケリー米国務長官とヴラジミール・プーチン大統領、セルゲイ・ラブロフ外務大臣のモスクワでの会談を受けたもので、ラブロフ外務大臣も、18日にニューヨークで予定されているシリア紛争関係国外相級会合への出席を表明した。

AFP, December 16, 2015、AP, December 16, 2015、ARA News, December 16, 2015、Champress, December 16, 2015、al-Hayat, December 17, 2015、Iraqi News, December 16, 2015、Kull-na Shuraka’, December 16, 2015、al-Mada Press, December 16, 2015、Naharnet, December 16, 2015、NNA, December 16, 2015、Reuters, December 16, 2015、SANA, December 16, 2015、UPI, December 16, 2015などをもとに作成。

(C)青山弘之 All rights reserved.